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Foreword !
 My original plan with this project was to explain why the Obama administration had 
failed to create an effective policy towards Iran. I had closely followed the development of Iran's 
nuclear program during the past few years, and relations between America and the Islamic 
Republic were stagnant.  I never expected that the focus of my topic would change so much in so 
little time.  While I have been working on this thesis, the United States and Iran have made more 
progress towards diplomacy than at any other time in the past thirty-five years.  
 Since American-Iranian relations broke down with the hostage crises that began in 1979, 
the United States has punished Iran for various behaviors deemed unacceptable. For example, the 
United States has sanctioned the Islamic Republic for supporting the terrorist groups Hezbollah 
and Hamas. The majority of sanctions, however, have been issued as a result of Iran’s failure to 
reveal various aspects of its nuclear program. Though Tehran has repeatedly claimed the nuclear 
program will only be used for peaceful purposes, there is a reluctance in Washington to believe 
this is true, and the Islamic Republic’s lack of transparency has led many in the United States to 
fear the worst. 
 In early 2011, Israel began a campaign to garner support for a military strike against Iran. 
Washington had recently issued a new round of sanctions, but Israeli Defense Minister Ehud 
Barak declared that the time for diplomacy had passed. While Israel’s threats of a preemptive 
strike against the Islamic Republic have begun to fade, Israel still supports military intervention 
to shut down Iran’s nuclear program. Israel has good reason to be wary of Iran, but the time for 
diplomacy has not passed; rather, it has just arrived. 
 On November 23, 2013, two days before the first draft of Chapter One of my thesis was 
due, I checked the news to find Iran had reached an interim agreement with six world powers, 
including the United States, regarding its nuclear program. My research question was no longer 
valid.  After more than thirty years without diplomacy, American-Iranian relations had a chance to 
evolve from antagonistic to cooperative. I could no longer ask why President Obama had failed to 
reach an international agreement with Iran because he was now the first president to do so since 
1979. 
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 When I started revising my chapter to reflect the recent developments in American-
Iranian relations, I found that many of the issues I had addressed before the interim agreement 
continue to be relevant. For example, the shadow of the hostage crisis still looms over the United 
States and the Islamic Republic. The United States has not lifted all of the sanctions against Iran, 
and many members of Congress want to implement more sanctions despite the interim agreement. 
Various other foreign actors fear the consequences of an Iran emboldened by rapprochement with 
the United States. Some Israeli leaders still advocate for a military strike against Iran. With all of 
the obstacles to American-Iranian diplomacy that remain in place, I asked: why now? What made 
recent attempts at diplomacy different from past attempts, and is there hope for future 
agreements? 
 My thesis begins with two chapters of background. The first looks at the hostage crisis, 
and the second looks at American-Iranian relations during President George W. Bush’s time in 
office. Even though there is a gap of more than twenty years between the subject matter of these 
chapters, I chose to include background on the hostage crisis because it fundamentally changed 
the nature of American-Iranian relations from cooperative to antagonistic. Understanding where 
these antagonisms came from, and how they have affected President Obama’s efforts to engage 
Iran, is crucial. I also chose to discuss President Bush’s Iran policy because it has limited 
President Obama’s capacity to repair diplomatic ties with the Islamic Republic. The rest of my 
thesis will focus on the Obama administration’s relationship with Tehran.  
 By laying out the difficulties encountered by the current administration, I hope to show 
what made the November agreement possible and how the progress it represents remains tenuous. 
The interim agreement is in place for six-months and, obviously, I am unable to predict what will 
happen when it expires. What I can do is situate the November agreement in the timeline of 
American-Iranian relations. Regardless of whether the diplomacy between the two nations 
persists or falters, this unprecedented moment of cooperation is helpful to analyzing the complex 
relationship between Washington and Tehran.  
!
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Chapter One: A Historic Phone Call !
Introduction !
 On September 27, 2013, President Barack Obama and the newly elected president 
of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, spoke on the phone. Their conversation lasted fifteen minutes 
and occurred as the two presidents were leaving the United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly. Following his conversation with President Obama, President Rouhani posted 
on Twitter that he and President Obama had expressed their mutual political will to reach 
an agreement regarding Iran’s nuclear program.  1
 The September 2013 phone call between President Obama and President Rouhani 
was the first time a United States president had spoken with an Iranian leader since 1979, 
when President Jimmy Carter spoke to Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi on the phone. 
President Carter never anticipated that the Shah would soon be ousted as a result of the 
Iranian Revolution. Even more unexpected was the 444-day-long imprisonment of fifty-
two American citizens at the United States embassy in Iran. The hostage crisis was the 
tipping point for United States-Iranian relations, an explosive signal to the United States 
that it could not manipulate Iran to satisfy American interests. Since then, the relationship 
between the United States and Iran has been marked by tension and failed diplomacy. 
Periodic excitement at opportunities for diplomatic breakthrough have quickly been 
followed by disappointment. The unprecedented phone call between President Obama 
and President Rouhani showed a cautious willingness of these two heads of state to 
initiate dialogue between their countries.   
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 Iranian leaders have repeatedly claimed that they support uranium enrichment for 
peaceful reasons. Former President Mohammad Ahmadinejad, for example, insisted that 
nuclear capability would boost Iran’s economy, providing jobs and a source of alternative 
energy. The United States, however, has been reluctant to believe Iranian leaders such as 
Ayatollah Khamenei who promise Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful: “Iran is not seeking 
to have the atomic bomb, possession of which is pointless, dangerous and is a great sin 
from an intellectual and religious point of view.”  Since September 11, 2001, and the 2
subsequent invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has invested billions of 
dollars to combat terrorism in the Middle East, and Iran is a known sponsor of prominent 
terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran’s nuclear program is perceived as a 
threat to the United States’ position in the region and is part of the reason President 
George W. Bush named Iran a member of the new “Axis of Evil” in one of his early 
speeches as president.  3
 Both conservative and liberal politicians fear that if the Islamic Republic were 
armed with atomic weapons, Iran would push the United States out of the Middle East 
with threats of nuclear strikes and subsequently engage in more extensive sponsorship of 
terrorist groups. If this scenario happens, the United States would lose influence in the 
Middle East and the Islamic Republic would emerge as a regional leader capable of 
mobilizing terrorists and neighboring countries against America. The pressure placed on 
the United States to persuade Iran to commit to non-proliferation is augmented by the 
American alliance with Israel, which feels severely threatened by the idea of a nuclear 
Iran. President Rouhani’s predecessor, President Ahmadinejad, is a Holocaust denier and 
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was one of many Iranian leaders, both past and present, who have expressed a desire to 
see Israel destroyed.   4
 While the United States has compelling reasons to prevent Iranian nuclear 
capability, Iran has its own rationale to continue enriching uranium. In the seventies, 
citizens of the United States were sent overseas to help finance the Islamic Republic’s 
modernization efforts and protect American oil interests. Iran’s economy boomed, but 
only people from the United States and a small group of elite Iranians reaped the 
monetary benefits. American-Iranian relations then rapidly disintegrated when President 
Carter offered to shelter the ousted Shah from the leaders of the Islamic Revolution. 
President Carter’s actions prompted the hostage crisis, which was carried out by Iranians 
as an attempt to persuade the president to hand over the Shah.  Even the resolution of the 5
crisis did not signify the end of American involvement in regional issues that affected 
Iran, as is evidenced by the United States’ involvement in the Iran-Iraq war. For Iran, 
nuclear capability is a way to define itself against a long history of United States 
influence, to gain power in the Middle East, and to give the Islamic Republic a greater 
capacity to affect international politics.   6
 Iranian officials have, for various reasons, consistently failed to convince the 
leaders of the United States that Iran’s nuclear program does not pose a threat to the 
America and its allies. For one thing, Iran has failed to make its nuclear program entirely 
transparent. Iran has given inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Association 
(IAEA), a branch of the UN, access to only a limited number of its nuclear facilities. This 
has impeded IAEA inspectors from determining Iran’s breakout time—the amount of 
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time it takes to produce the material required for one atomic weapon—and verifying that 
Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful. Iran’s failure to reveal its nuclear program’s breakout 
time leads the United States and the international community to assume that the Islamic 
Republic is hiding something sinister, like an intention to pass weapons on to terrorist 
groups or bomb Israel.   7
 Between 2012 and 2013, Iran’s stockpile of medium-enriched uranium nearly 
doubled and the number of centrifuges expanded from 12,000 to 19,000.  As Iran 8
continues to expand its nuclear program, there is a growing a sense of urgency among the 
United States and several of its allies to reach a deal that prevents Iran from being 
capable of producing atomic weapons. David Albright, president of the Institute for 
Science and International Security and a former inspector for the IAEA, advised that 
President Obama’s team should “try and find a way to lengthen the breakout times and 
shorten the time that inspectors could detect breakout.”  Israeli politicians, fearful of the 9
consequences of a nuclear Iran, have repeatedly advised the United States to consider 
joint military strikes against the unyielding Islamic Republic. President Obama continues 
to give economic sanctions and diplomacy a chance to convince Iran to be more 
transparent, perhaps because he knows because a military strike would be a risky 
operation.  10
  In October 2013, President Obama’s negotiators were busy preparing to meet 
with President Rouhani’s negotiators in Geneva to resume talks regarding Iran’s nuclear 
program. In November 2013, Iran reached an interim agreement with six world powers: 
France, Germany, Britain, China, Russia, and the United States. Iran agreed to halt its 
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progression towards nuclear breakout by suspending uranium enrichment above a 
concentration of five percent, the level suitable for running nuclear power stations. To 
prove compliance, Iran also committed to allowing increased UN nuclear inspections. In 
return, Iran will receive limited sanctions relief and access to more than $4 billion in 
frozen Iranian oil sales revenue, a prospect that sent Iranian citizens into a frenzy of 
excitement. The strictest oil and investment sanctions will remain in place to give 
President Obama leverage to further pursue the shut down of Iran’s nuclear program after 
this interim agreement ends in sixth months.   11
 The October phone call between President Obama and President Rouhani sparked 
hope for those who believe that diplomacy should be given a chance to work. The 
conversation between the two presidents helped pave the way to the November 
agreement, a first step towards the imposition of diplomatic standards between 
Washington and Tehran. Why have the United States and Iran progressed more towards 
repairing diplomatic ties in the past eight months than in the past thirty years, and what 
factors could destroy this political momentum? My analysis will discuss what has shaped 
each country’s current foreign policy towards the other and clarify why past efforts to 
restore diplomatic relations between the two nations have failed. This will help explain 
the tensions between the United States and Iran, show what challenges President Obama 
has faced when formulating his Iran policy, and assess whether the progress of the 
November agreement can be maintained. !
!
!
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Literature Review: Politics 
 One group of authors focuses on politics to explain the tension that, until recently, 
has crippled diplomacy between Washington and Tehran. Some of these scholars use 
history as a lens through which to explain recent policy decisions of American and 
Iranian politicians. This is useful for understanding diplomatic obstacles that are still 
working to impede negotiations between the Obama administration and Iran’s leaders. In 
his book Going to Tehran, Flynn Leverett provides detailed descriptions of the most 
important aspects of The United State’s relationship with Iran since the Islamic 
Revolution. Leverett argues that since the hostage crisis, many American legislators have 
invested so much energy and political capital in demonizing the Islamic Republic for its 
ideologically driven politics that they cannot take Iran seriously as a a strategic actor.   12
 Throughout his analysis, Leverett points to several instances in which Iran 
reached out to the United States following the Islamic Revolution only to be harshly 
rejected. He does so to show that Iran is not inherently opposed to diplomacy with the 
United States and to argue that moving beyond historical antagonisms is possible and 
necessary to allow for a greater possibility of successful negotiations. Leverett’s 
argument, however, does not account for the domestic impact of September 11 on 
American politics or the fact that Iran has a history of funding terrorist groups. 
 Iran’s support of terrorism affects how the United States approaches negotiations 
by limiting the ability of the United States to concede to Iran. A desire to maintain 
credibility in the fight against terror restricts the ability of American politicians to 
negotiate with nations who sponsor terrorist groups. As White House Press secretary Jay 
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Carney said in March 2014, “It is important to make clear that even as we continue 
efforts to resolve our concerns over Iran’s nuclear program through diplomacy, we will 
continue, in coordination with our partners and allies, to push back against Iranian 
support for terrorism.”  By understanding how this dynamic has influenced the manner 13
in which American leaders and diplomats approach talks with Iran, we can better predict 
how Iran’s links to terrorist groups will affect negotiations in the future.  
 Another approach used to explain the difficulties faced by the United States and 
Iran with regards to negotiations is to analyze the reasoning behind the recent foreign 
policy decisions of one of the two countries. Trita Parsi’s book A Single Roll of the Dice 
offers an argument for why the United States can and should reach a compromise with 
Iran regarding its nuclear program. Parsi examines President Obama’s foreign policy 
approach in great detail, emphasizing President Obama’s attempts to persuade Tehran to 
abandon the pursuit of nuclear power. The epilogue of Parsi’s book lays out six policy 
suggestions for the Obama administration. Parsi’s most important points are as follows: 
the United States needs (1) to rely less on sanctions; (2) to develop more effective 
negotiating strategies, such as fuel swaps, that offer benefits to the other side; and (3) to 
realize that a nuclear Iran is inevitable.   14
 Parsi’s focus on international politics, however, fails to take into account domestic 
politics. The President’s foreign policy options are restricted by the influence of pro-
Israel lobbying groups that do not want Iran to have any nuclear technologies. These 
constraints will need to be taken into account when the interim agreement ends and 
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President Obama has to make a new round of decisions on how to approach negotiations 
with Iran.  
  Vali Nasr argues in his book The Dispensable Nation that President Obama’s 
foreign policy in the Middle East is constrained by his reluctance to compromise with 
countries in the region. In his chapter on Iran, Nasr primarily focuses on one aspect 
American foreign policy: the use of economic sanctions. Nasr reiterates numerous times 
that the United States needs to find a more effective way of using its political and 
economic power as leverage in negotiations. He argues that sanctions have contributed to 
the elusiveness of successful diplomacy by making Iranians bitter through the weakening 
of their economy.  Nasr’s argument that sanctions are a weak foreign policy strategy, 15
however, is called into question by the November agreement. Iranians who voted for 
President Rouhani did so because of his promise to “alleviate the pain of sanctions.” His 
support of the November agreement shows that sanctions have the potential to persuade a 
leader participate in diplomatic talks.  Despite this, Nasr’s analysis can be used to 16
determine how the Obama administration can balance punitive sanctions with diplomacy.  
 Authors who approach the relationship between Washington and Tehran from a 
political perspective focus on the differences between their respective foreign policy 
strategies. This is useful for understanding not only how diplomacy has been impeded in 
the past, but also how each country will approach negotiations in the future. The majority 
of authors who have analyzed the differences of Washington’s and Tehran’s foreign 
policy conclude that the United States would benefit from improved relations with Iran. 
The problem is that those authors jump from an analysis of what prevented diplomacy 
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between the two nations in the past to the conclusion that each country would benefit 
from a more cooperative relationship with the other. They do so without factoring in 
domestic politics or such dilemmas as Iran’s support of terrorist groups or its hostility 
towards Israel, America’s most significant ally in the Middle East. Further explanation as 
to why the two countries took decades to overcome their antagonisms and reap the 
benefits of a stronger diplomatic relationship is needed to understand the obstacles that 
could still potentially destroy the momentum of the November agreement. 
Literature Review: The Evolution of Stereotypes 
 Rather than focusing on the political relationship between the United States and 
Iran, a distinct strand of literature analyzes the cultural construct each country has of the 
other. Cultural constructs, in this context, refer to stereotypes that Iran and the United 
States use to demonize one another. This analysis looks at how such stereotypes have 
manifested and evolved in the rhetoric of each country’s politicians. Scholars study the 
media and the word choices of political leaders to understand how and why people in the 
United States and Iran perceive each other in the manner that they do.  
 David Farber in Taken Hostage focuses on a specific event, the hostage crisis, and 
examines how the crisis impacted American perceptions of Iran and vice versa. The 
hostage crisis happened during a time characterized by economic hardship and fatigue 
over the Cold War, when people in the United States worried about the threat the Soviet 
Union posed to the position of their country in the international community. Farber 
argues that the hostage crisis embodied the existential fears of American citizens by 
making the United States look vulnerable. He writes that the media’s harsh demonization 
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of Iran and its citizens was accepted by people in the United States because it gave them 
a scapegoat, an external source to blame for their everyday problems.  Farber’s book is a 17
great starting point for understanding the roots of the United States’ reluctance to trust 
Iranians and their cultural constructs of one another.  
 In his book The Great Satan vs. The Mad Mullahs, William O. Beeman looks at 
the evolution of the two stereotypes he names in the title of his book. He analyzes the 
time period between the hostage crisis and the months following September 11 to explain 
the origins of the current perceptions that Iran and the United States have of one another. 
Iran, for example, calls the United States the Great Satan because the West and its 
attractions embody the lure of the external world. Past meddling of the United States in 
Iranian affairs makes the United States the ultimate representation of the temptations of 
the West.  The United States, in turn, is skeptical of the Islamic Republic because it was 18
founded on the idea that religion and state politics are linked, whereas the United States 
was founded on the exact opposite principal. Iran is therefore often perceived as a nation 
led by Mad Mullahs, unpredictable, irrational religious extremists who cannot be 
reasoned with at the negotiating table.    19
 As previously discussed, scholars who focus on the political relationship between 
Washington and Tehran argue that the two sides would benefit from normalized relations. 
Factoring in perceptions that each country has of the other can explain why diplomacy 
has been elusive until recently. Cultural studies of the relationship between the United 
States and Iran show each nation has a difficult time conceding to the other because of 
stereotypes that have emerged. Literature that deconstructs these stereotypes, however, is 
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still lacking. It is true the United States and Iran make foreign policy decisions that are 
based in part on their respective cultural biases of one another. The problem is the dearth 
of analysis on how and why cultural biases have such a strong influence on the decision-
making processes of both countries, even in situations where there is ample evidence that 
both would benefit from stronger diplomatic ties. 
 To explain why the United States and Iran have, in the past, failed to restore 
relations and what circumstances made the breakthrough November agreement possible, 
a new approach is necessary for analyzing the relationship between the United States and 
Iran. The literature about the United States and Iran has tended to provide either an 
explanation of the variances in the political strategies of each country or a constructivist 
analysis of their cultural antagonisms. There is very little overlap between the two 
approaches, which leads to limited analysis.  
 Many in Iran want to defy the egotistical Great Satan, and many in the United 
States want to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the unpredictable and irrational 
Mad Mullahs. Understanding how these cultural biases were formed can help explain 
how they have altered the political decision making processes of each country’s leaders 
and limited the possibility for diplomacy. Through my analysis of the relationship 
between Washington and Tehran, I will show how and why political actors from each 
nation have often been discouraged from pursuing engagement with the other. The extent 
to which the United States and Iran are capable of successful diplomacy is contingent on 
whether each side’s leaders are able to obtain political benefits for their country that are 
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perceived as valuable enough to transcend the hostilities that exist between the two 
nations. 
Method 
  My argument will be driven by an examination of existing sources: scholarly 
articles and books, news articles, and congressional reports. During my research, I was 
inspired by the arguments of two scholars: Paul Pierson’s theory of increasing returns and 
path dependency and Robert Putnam’s theory of two-level games. Pierson argues that 
politicians tend to repeat known decision-making processes because those processes offer 
a familiar set of outcomes and therefore appear less risky. While Pierson did not invent 
the concept, I chose to reference him as an authority on the subject because of his 
addition of how the concept of increasing returns relates to path dependency. Pierson 
borrows from the study of economics in order to argue that path dependence is a self 
reinforcing behavior that often rewards political actors with positive feedback. His 
analysis will be useful for explaining why the United States and Iran demonize one 
another even when they could benefit from repaired relations.   20
 I was also inspired by Putnam’s work because I found that his argument can be 
used to explain why the positive feedback Pierson refers to inspires path dependence. 
Putnam looks at how domestic politics influence the ability of a country’s leaders to 
negotiate at the international level. Putnam’s work is useful for understanding how the 
domestic political context of both the United States and Iran can influence the foreign 
policy of each nation and limit the diplomatic options of their respective leaders. 
Domestic political actors often discourage foreign policymakers from offering diplomatic 
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concessions. This can limit the capacity of foreign policymakers to agree to international 
agreements for fear of compromising domestic interests.    21
 The conclusion of each chapter will provide an analysis of the information 
presented using Putnam and Pierson’s arguments. Together, the works of Putnam and 
Pierson can help to understand the circumstances necessary for two countries with 
abnormal relations, such as the United States and Iran, to engage in successful diplomacy. 
Chapter Organization 
 Historical context is important for understanding the current relationship between 
the United States and Iran and why diplomacy between the two countries is a difficult 
feat to achieve. Disagreements over how to address Iran’s uranium enrichment are rooted 
in hostilities that originated several decades ago. Chapter Two will be a discussion of the 
event that caused Iran and the United States to be estranged from one another: the Iranian 
hostage crisis. Through an analysis of the rhetoric of politicians and the portrayal of the 
hostages in the media, I will argue that the hostage crisis was the critical juncture in the 
relationship between the two countries. The uncertainty surrounding the fate of the 
innocent victims in the crisis, and the difficulties in negotiating their release, set the stage 
for decades of antagonism between Iran and United States.  
 The next two chapters will look at how the idea of a nuclear Iran came to be 
considered a threat by the United States and its allies. Chapter Three will begin by 
delving into the significance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the 
international obligations that come with signing it. Through an analysis of the 
consequences of Iran’s violations of the NPT and President Bush’s “Axis of Evil” speech, 
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I will explain why hostility between the United States and Iran increased in the years 
following 9/11, even after Iran offered to assist America in the Middle East. President 
Bush and President Ahmadinejad each focused more on domestic interests rather than 
foreign cooperation. This led to a clash of interests between the United States and Iran. 
Chapter Four will be an analysis of this clash of interests and how regional politics in the 
Middle East affect President Obama’s Iran policy. Looking at the dynamics between the 
United Sates, Iran, and their respective allies, I will analyze why the United States has 
repeatedly been inclined to pursue policies of containment towards the Islamic Republic. 
For American policymakers, the benefits of restricting Iranian influence in the Middle 
East frequently outweigh the perceived risks of engaging Iran.  
 Chapter Five will discuss what aspects of domestic politics have influenced the 
Obama administration’s approach to negotiations with Iran. I will primarily examine the 
relationship between pro-Israel lobbyists and Congress. This dynamic has restricted 
President Obama and members of his administration from pursuing more cooperative 
strategies regarding negotiations with Iran. There is wide support for sanctions in 
Congress by members who seek to appease the powerful lobbyists. This has helped make 
sanctions the most frequently used tactic to pressure Iran to abandon nuclear 
proliferation. Sanctions are viewed as practical because they work to undermine Iran’s 
banking and energy industries, therefore decreasing Iran’s ability to proliferate without 
military strikes. In terms of diplomacy, sanctions can be a useful way to gain leverage 
over Iran in negotiations because sanctions relief can be offered in exchange for 
compliance with the requests of the United States and the international community.  The 22
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problem is that the Obama administration has not always combined the imposition of 
sanctions with incentives. Iran needs to be persuaded that it will be rewarded for 
cooperating with the United States. Otherwise, negotiations will remain unproductive.  
 Finally, Chapter Six will analyze the circumstances necessary for success in the 
November agreement as well as various reactions to the agreement, including the 
excitement of Iranian citizens, the fury of Israeli leaders, and the skeptical statements 
made by Republicans in Congress. I will argue that Iran’s economic suffering was the 
primary reason its leaders agreed to the agreement, and I will explain why the 
achievements of the agreement are fragile and vulnerable to political hardliners in both 
the United States and Iran.  
Conclusion 
 With the general information provided in this chapter, it is already possible to see 
the various obstacles that have in the past worked to prevent successful diplomacy 
between Iran and the United States. Each country has very distinct foreign policy goals 
and diplomatic decision-making tactics, and each is hesitant to concede to the other 
because of the perception that there are few benefits to doing so. Various scholars have 
offered explanations for the motivations of Iran and the United States. Some use politics, 
for example, to explain why the United States is invested in preventing a nuclear Iran at 
all costs. Others have used cultural studies to explain such phenomenon as why Iranian 
leaders continue to use such rhetoric as calling the United States the Great Satan. 
Explanations such as these, however, are insufficient on their own.  
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  Throughout the following chapters I will discuss various facets of the American-
Iranian relationship to show how politics and culture have intersected to impede 
diplomacy. In doing so, I hope to provide a clearer answer why each nation makes the 
foreign policy decisions it does and to demonstrate there is additional room for successful 
diplomacy. Diplomacy is not an easy task for two countries who have been antagonistic 
towards one another for over thirty years. As represented by the historic phone call and 
subsequent agreement that took place between their respective leaders, the United States 
and the Islamic Republic are wobbling at the edge of a tipping point. The leaders of each 
country have a chance to make diplomacy work, but a myriad of political and cultural 
factors could cause one or both nations to walk away from the negotiating table. 
!
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Chapter Two: The Hostage Crisis and the Origins of American-Iranian Hostility !
Build-Up to Revolution !
 The Iranian hostage crisis, referred to in Farsi as “the Conquest of the American 
Spy Den,” changed the course of relations between the United States and Iran. Before the 
crisis, the United States had provided financial and political support to Shah Mohammed 
Reza Pahlavi after supporting his rise to power. During World War II, allied powers saw 
Reza Shah, the existing Shah of Iran and father of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, as a threat 
to victory. Reza Shah’s refusal to allow Iranian territory to be used as a transport corridor 
to ship arms to the Soviet Union prompted Britain and the Soviet Union to occupy Iran. 
Reza Shah was forced to abdicate in favor of his son, who opened up Iran to the Allied 
powers. When Mohammed Reza Pahlavi became Shah, Iran and the United States 
became important allies.  23
 During the 1950s, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi was locked in a power struggle 
with Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddegh. In 1953, Prime Minister Mosaddegh led a 
general strike by the impoverished people of Iran to gain a 50-percent share of petroleum 
revenues from Britain’s Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. This prompted Britain, which was 
still recovering from the severe economic damage inflicted by World War II, to partner 
with the United States’ spy agencies in order to depose Mosaddegh and his government. 
The military coup d’état, codenamed Operation Ajax, helped the Shah expand his power 
from constitutional monarch to absolute monarch.  24
  The United States not only helped the Shah overthrow his father and establish 
power but also continued supporting and funding the Shah’s regime after the coup. 
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During Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi’s rule, Iran underwent intense modernization and 
industrialization, more than the Islamic Republic had ever experienced throughout its 
history. Iran, however, was almost entirely dependent on Western countries for the 
impetus of modernization during the twentieth century. The United States provided 
assistance with industrialization, but American technicians moved to Iran to make their 
own money rather than because of a desire to help bolster the Iranian economy. This is 
evident in the fact that Americans, for one thing, were paid more than Iranian workers. 
When the Iranian government agreed to compensate American companies for housing for 
their employees if they completed a designated project, Americans began renting mass 
numbers of Iranian apartments. Rental costs were driven up throughout the country, and 
Iranian citizens were burdened with the cost of inflation.   25
 Ancient Persia had been a mighty civilization, but modern Iran was still searching 
for its identity, and many Iranians worried that their lifestyle would be consumed by the 
Western world.  As the United States rapidly increased its involvement in Iran’s 26
economic affairs, this foreign intrusion into Iranian society began to overwhelm the many 
Iranian citizens who saw Western society as contradictory to their values and beliefs. The 
population of Tehran had quadrupled and culture shock was rampant. Smog polluted the 
air and “the leisurely pace of life of earlier years had turned into a frantic struggle for 
most citizens.”  While most Iranians struggled to adjust to the changes, the upper classes 27
of society, including the throne itself, became partners in the country’s development plan 
and reaped great economic benefits.    28
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 The United States provided financial support to the Shah not just through the 
export of workers but also through the purchase of oil. Iran was a member of the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which decided to implement 
an oil embargo in 1973. The Shah was not directly involved in the decision to embargo 
oil, but he did benefit from it. He continued to sell oil to the United States during the 
embargo and thus made the United States dependent on maintaining its partnership with 
Iran. Furthermore, the Shah monopolized oil revenues and used them, for example, to 
buy weapons.   29
 After oil prices increased in 1973, the country was flooded with money. The lower 
and middle classes of society “had no access whatsoever to investment capital through 
normal channels.”  With nowhere for most of the oil money to go, inflation rose to 50 30
percent per annum by 1976. Varying classes of Iranian citizens ranging from factory 
workers to bazaar merchants began to express discontent. They were frustrated that they 
had not been given access to participate in Iran’s new economy and now had to pay the 
price for the country’s rapid industrialization.   31
 With inflation on the rise, the influence of outside nations to help with rising costs 
and providing technology became essential to the continued survival of development 
programs. Resentment began to grow among the more traditional sectors of the 
population. The throne, feeling threatened by the growing dissatisfaction, began to show 
signs of paranoia and retaliated harshly against any expression of dissent. Demonstrations 
against the Shah began in October of 1977. As the Shah increased the number of 
crackdowns on protestors, the opposition movement grew and more Iranians abandoned 
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their loyalties to the Shah. Over the next two years the protests escalated until the Shah, 
fearing for his life, abandoned his position and left the country.  32
  On February 1, 1979, Ayatollah Kohmeini, who had been in exile for fifteen 
years due to his opposition to the Shah, returned to Iran. On the day of his arrival, 
Ayatollah Khomeini made clear his fierce rejection of interim prime minister Shapour 
Bakhtiar’s government. Ayatollah Khomeini appointed his own competing interim prime 
minister, Mehdi Bazargan, on February 4. As Ayatollah Khomeini’s movement gained 
momentum, soldiers began to defect to his side. On February 11, with the military now 
supporting Khomeini, revolutionaries took over government buildings, the Pahlavi 
dynasty collapsed, and the Islamic Republic was born.   33
The United States’ Fears and President Carter’s Mistake 
 For the United States, the Iranian Revolution had various negative consequences. 
By the 1970s, the United States had formed a reliant partnership with the Shah. The Shah 
regularly purchased American-made arms and served as a “protector of stability and U.S. 
interests in the Persian Gulf.”  Some members of President Jimmy Carter’s 34
administration had a positive perception of the Shah’s departure, disparaging him as an 
autocrat and a violator of human rights. Most, however, saw the Shah’s ousting “as a 
shocking setback to U.S. interests in the region.”   35
 The new regime, led by Ayatollah Khomeini, frequently spouted anti-American 
rhetoric and blamed the United States for augmenting the suffering experienced by 
Iranians in recent decades. The Ayatollah and other revolutionaries championed the image 
of the United States as the Great Satan, “the great external corruptor of culture and 
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morality, supporter of illegitimate power, and destroyer of natural bonds that bind men to 
each other in a relationship of mutual benefit....”  Iran wanted to end the involvement of 36
the United States in Iranian affairs: “After the revolution in 1979, Iran’s history [had] 
entered a new phase of evolution. The concept of the Islamic republic and the Islamic 
government was a new notion which had an anti-Western policy orientation.”  The 37
leaders of the Iranian Revolution sought to eliminate the notion that Iran is dependent on 
Western nations to help with modernization and economic progress.   38
  In the struggle to establish the Islamic Republic’s identity, a central symbolic 
pattern emerged in Iran: “The struggle between the inside, the internal, the core, to 
conquer the outside, the external, the periphery.”  After the Revolution, the United States 39
came to represent external forces that threatened the core values and belief systems of 
Iranian citizens. Because of United States involvement in Iran’s economic affairs and its 
strong alliance with the Shah during his reign, the United States could easily be held 
partially responsible for Iran’s economic difficulties and inequalities.  Establishing the 40
Islamic Republic as an independent power in the Middle East, as it once was in the days 
of the Persian empire, would not be possible if Iran maintained friendly relations with the 
United States.   
 President Carter attempted to accommodate the new government of the Islamic 
Republic because Iran was an important strategic partner in the Persian Gulf, but he never 
sought to make Iran the focal point of his presidency. On October 22, 1979, Carter made 
a decision that would soon serve as evidentiary support for the regime leaders of the 
Islamic Republic, who consistently accused the United States of seeking to meddle in 
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Iranian affairs: he permitted the Shah, who was ill with lymphoma, to enter New York 
Hospital-Cornell Medical Center for cancer treatment.  
Imagery of the Great Satan and the Logic of the Hostage Takers 
 During the time following the Iranian Revolution, images of the United States as 
the Great Satan slowly began to emerge and spread around the country. The words Great 
Satan were written on posters, graffitied on walls, and invoked by politicians. Iranian 
leaders began to claim that religious and cultural values were being threatened by the 
temptations of the Great Satan and the external Western world. The image of the United 
States as the Great Satan began with America’s involvement in Iran’s industrialization in 
the decades leading up to the Iranian Revolution and culminated with President Carter’s 
offer to shelter the Shah.   41
 The admittance of the Shah into the United States intensified the anti-American 
feelings of Iranian revolutionaries and spawned rumors of the United States planning a 
coup to reinstall the Shah.  Many Iranians, including Ayatollah Khomeini, saw 42
America’s protection of the Shah as proof that the United States was acting as the Great 
Satan and was intent on debasing Iranian society. Ayatollah Khomeini increasingly used 
the notion of the Great Satan as a rhetorical device to convince Iranians that the United 
States was colluding with the Shah. The Shah was portrayed as an illegitimate authority, 
and the United States became viewed as the ultimate corrupting force because of 
American support for the Shah.  43
 The Muslim Student Followers of the Imam’s Line, a group of students who 
supported Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Revolution, demanded that the Shah be 
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returned to Iran to face trial and execution. Despite being advised by various members of 
his cabinet not to allow the Shah to reside in the United States, or else risk fueling the 
already alarming spread of anti-American sentiment, President Carter reluctantly decided 
to protect the Shah. President Carter was convinced by key staff members such as Henry 
Kissinger not to send the Shah back to Iran because this would be the equivalent of 
condemning him to death. On November 4, 1979, in response to President Carter’s 
decision, the Muslim Student Followers stormed the United States’ embassy in Tehran 
and took hostage the fifty-two American citizens who were inside.  The hostage crisis 44
was a shock to President Carter because never before had a country, let alone a former 
ally, questioned the position of the United States in such a dangerous and defiant manner.  
  For the hostage takers, capturing American citizens and holding them prisoner 
functioned as a superlative act of defiance against the Great Satan: “They wanted to 
electrify the Iranian people and mobilize the support for an uncompromising Islamic 
Revolutionary government that neither feared nor accommodated itself to Western 
interests and intrigues.”  The embassy officials were representative of the United States 45
government “which had subverted their political system, supported a dictator who had 
tortured and killed dissidents, and sought to destroy their revolution.”  The Iranian 46
students attacked the United States embassy in order to show their support for Ayatollah 
Khomeini and his Islamic Republic, and they warned President Carter that the hostages 
would be held until the United States agreed to return the Shah to Iran to face justice.  47
!
!
!27
The Hostage Crisis as a Critical Juncture 
 The hostage crisis marked a change in the relationship between the United States 
and Iran. Once close allies, the two countries were now trying to negotiate the release of 
fifty-two captured American citizens. In his article, Hillel David Soifer analyzes the 
causal logic of critical junctures, which he defines as a potential turning point in the 
relationship between two countries in which “the interlocked networks of relation that 
preserve stability come unglued and the (normal) perpetual change of social life takes 
over.”  The hostage crisis was a critical juncture because it disintegrated the already 48
increasingly antagonistic relationship between the United States and Iran. More than that, 
however, the crisis affected how the way the two countries perceive one another.  
 President Carter’s refusal to return the Shah in exchange for the release of his own 
citizens served as evidence for the Iranian regime that the United States was acting as the 
Great Satan and was determined to intervene in Iran to further its own interests. The 
longer President Carter refused to extradite the Shah, the more the Islamic Republic 
worried that the United States was plotting to reinstate the Shah’s regime. While Iran saw 
the hostage crisis as a defensive statement against the influence of the United States, the 
United States saw the crisis as a vicious act of terrorism. The capture of the hostages 
made Iranians look, to people in the United States, like religious extremists who engaged 
in threatening, irrational behavior.   49
 The impact of the hostage crisis is not isolated to the period in which negotiations 
for the release of the hostages took place. As Soifer explains, “what makes a juncture 
critical is that the outcomes generated in one historical moment persist over time. 
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Mechanisms of reproduction are the factors that are sufficient to keep an outcome in 
place after the factors that produce it have disappeared.”   50
 The crisis was a critical juncture not just because it destroyed any vestiges of a 
diplomatic relationship between the United States and Iran. Decades after the hostage 
crisis, Iran would continue to perceive the United States as meddlesome and imperialistic 
while the United States would continue to view Iran as a country who supports religious 
extremism. In other words, the hostage crisis generated the development of stereotypes 
that have hindered diplomatic relations from being repaired for decades.  
The Role of the American Media in the United States During the Crisis 
 This shift in how the United States perceived Iran was largely the result of the 
new role of mass media that emerged following the takeover of the American embassy in 
Tehran. In 1978, very few people in the United States cared about Iran or the Shah. They 
were more concerned with the economic downturn that the United States was 
experiencing at the time. Oil prices were rising and inflation was increasing at the  rate of 
ten percent annually, threatening to uproot the lives of American citizens.  After the 51
takeover of the embassy in Tehran, coverage of the hostages’ situation dominated news 
outlets and Iran became the focal point of national attention.  
 Even though the hostage crisis did not directly affect anyone in the country 
directly other than the families of those captured, the fate of the hostages became tied to 
the fate of the nation. Anxiety over the economy had caused Americans to question the 
place of the United States in the world before the Iranian students stormed the embassy. 
The hostage crisis was alarming to people because the United States was portrayed for 
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the first time as being vulnerable to attacks from people with seemingly different 
livelihoods and beliefs. While people had worried about the energy and economic crises 
that affected their daily lives, the hostage crisis turned their attention to something larger 
than themselves.   52
 Media coverage of the hostage crisis had “a profound and sweeping impact on the 
perceptions and emotions of the American public.”  One day after the hostages were 53
captured, ABC broadcasted images of men with black beards and women shrouded in 
chadors screaming in rage while the United States flag went up in flames.  This imagery 54
set up a narrative that would dominate the coverage of the Hostage Crisis for the next 444 
days: United States citizens were under attack by American-hating, religious fanatics in 
Iran.  Interviews of tearful wives and mothers begging for their husbands and children to 55
be returned dominated the airwaves. Family members functioned as stand-ins for the 
actual hostages and helped to shift the focus away from the political context of the 
crisis.   56
 Walter Cronkite, anchor of CBS Evening News, demonstrated America’s 
preoccupation with the hostages by ending every broadcast during the crisis in the 
following manner:  “And that’s the way it is Friday, January 4, 1980, the 61st day of 
captivity for the American hostages in Iran.”  As the crisis progressed, Americans 57
publicly expressed their solidarity with the hostages. People hung yellow ribbons on 
everything ranging from trees in their yard to their cars in order to express their 
sympathies for the hostages and their families. The hostages were not thought of as the 
victims of a complex political crisis but rather as members of the national family. Their 
!30
captivity came to represent new dangers that faced not just them, but the United States as 
a whole. 
Conclusion: The Implementation of Sanctions and the Origins of Path Dependency 
 On July 27, 1980, the former Shah died as a result of his illness. Less than two 
months later, Iraq invaded Iran. These two events prompted Iran to meet with the United 
States to negotiate the hostages’ release, which President Carter eventually did by 
promising to unfreeze billions of dollars’ worth of Iranian assets. Iran was willing to 
accept this exchange because the country desperately needed funds to wage war against 
Iraq. President Carter’s reelection chances, however, were destroyed by the fact that he 
was unable to negotiate the freedom of the hostages before the 1980 presidential election. 
It was not until the final hours of his presidency that President Carter reached an 
agreement with Iran. The hostages were released on January 20, 1981, twenty minutes 
into newly elected president Ronald Reagan’s inaugural address.  58
 President Carter’s initial response to the hostage crisis was to implement 
sanctions. Along with ordering the end of diplomatic relations with Iran, President Carter 
froze all Iranian government assets in the United States.  The freezing of Iranian assets 59
gave President Carter a new tool for negotiating the hostages’ release, one that put 
significant pressure on the Iranian economy. In April 1980, President Carter sought to 
create further leverage with Iran by imposing a trade embargo. The embargo included a 
ban on direct and indirect imports of Iranian goods and services to the United States, 
excluding news publications.  60
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 Even though President Carter released Iranian assets to secure the freedom of the 
hostages, the trade embargo he implemented remained in place and was tightened during 
Reagan’s presidency. This was due to the “increasing concerns about Iran’s development 
of military equipment and the threat of American interests in the Persian Gulf.”  61
Furthermore, the vilification of Iran by news outlets and the American government 
helped perpetuate the notion that the attack on the embassy in Tehran was an act of 
terrorism: “the seizure of the embassy and its staff also identified Iran in the American 
consciousness as the number one terrorist state in the world.”  In 1984, Iran was placed 62
on the list of international sponsors of terrorism.   63
 The hostage crisis was a critical juncture not just because it affected the way the 
United States and Iran perceive each other, but because the change in perception 
continues to affect how the two countries interact. This is part of a phenomena known as 
path dependence, which Pierson explains in his argument occurs when “preceding steps 
in a particular direction induce further movement in the same direction.”  In the case of 64
America and Iran, the relationship between the two countries shifted towards path 
dependency when President Reagan decided to continue President Carter’s new strategy 
of punitive action against the Islamic Republic. 
 In his discussion of the relationship between domestic and international politics, 
Putnam defines a country’s “win-set” as a set of all possible international agreements that 
would win domestically by gaining the necessary majority number of constituents. When 
two countries are engaged in diplomacy, and country A has a large win-set, there is a 
higher likelihood that the win-sets of country A will overlap with those of country B. 
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When win-sets overlap, the possibility for diplomatic agreement increases.  At the time 65
President Reagan entered office, the hostage crisis had caused Iran to be perceived as a 
threat by both the government and the people. Iran had targeted American citizens, and 
there was no scenario in which cooperation with the Islamic Republic would have been 
approved by the majority of the American public.  President Reagan had no motivation 66
to repair relations because the United States did not have a win-set for Iran. 
 Path dependency occurs for a variety of reasons that encourage people to act in 
ways that uphold the status quo regarding the relationship between two countries. One of 
these reasons is that the political costs of creating a new foreign policy strategy are often 
high, due to a lack of win-sets, and incentivize policymakers to “identify and stick with a 
single option.”  Throughout the hostage crisis and after, politicians perpetuated the 67
demonization of Iran both in speech and in action, supporting sanctions that placed 
pressure on the Iranian economy.  Creating a new foreign policy strategy to engage Iran 68
would have required President Reagan to contradict 444-days worth of rhetoric, spread 
by news outlets, that slandered Iran as a nation of American-hating extremists. 
Maintaining the implementation of sanctions and refraining from engagement with Iran 
was an easier strategy. Politicians, including the President, did not want to appear to their 
constituents that they were cooperating with a nation who had attacked American 
citizens.  69
 Since the hostage crisis, Iran and the United States have not fully repaired their 
diplomatic relationship. Iran has retained its status as an arch-terrorist state and thus 
continues to be perceived by many, both citizens and politicians, as an unrelenting enemy. 
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This is, in part, the result of adaptive expectations. Adaptive expectations are another 
cause of path dependency that helps explain why policymakers have made few alterations 
to their Iran strategy, even decades after the release of the hostages. 
 Adaptive expectations signify that “projects about future [political scenarios] lead 
individuals to adapt their actions in ways that help make those expectations come true.”  70
The notion that Iran is a threat is upheld each time American news outlets broadcast, for 
example, footage of Iranian protestors chanting a phrase that originated during the 
Islamic Revolution: “Death to America!”  Such images become evidence for politicians 71
and constituents who support the use of punitive action against Iran to argue that Iran has 
not changed since the hostage crisis. If engagement with Iran is proposed, politicians who 
disagree can point to the latest public display of anti-American sentiment in Iran. 
Protestors chanting “Death to America!”contribute to an already convincing argument, 
one that cites Iran’s sponsorship of terrorism and lack of nuclear transparency (which will 
be discussed further in the next chapter) as reasons for distrusting Iran. Politicians have 
little reason to support engagement because any concessions they make to Iran will be 
constructed as peace offerings to a dangerous and unpredictable enemy state.  72
 Iranian leaders, after the release of the hostages, also lacked a compelling reason 
to engage the United States. Iran was preoccupied with creating a reputation centered on 
defiance of America and the West. Cooperation with the United States would have 
contradicted this vision of the new Islamic Republic.  Even today, attempts to engage 73
America are attacked as making Iran vulnerable. Progress is also difficult to achieve 
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when prominent politicians, such as Ayatollah Khamenei in late 2013, refer to America as 
“the devil incarnate” who has plans for “evil domination of Iran.”  74
 Moving away from the current course of path dependency would be a political 
risk for the leaders of either country. As discussed above, the United States is hesitant to 
trust Iran, and Iran does not want to succumb to American influence. To understand the 
diplomatic challenges faced by each country, it is important to first analyze the different 
manners in which the United States and Iran view Iran’s nuclear program. This will help 
explain why path dependency has continued more than thirty years after the hostage crisis 
ended.  
!
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Chapter Three: Iran’s Violations of the NPT and the Impact of Post-9/11 Fears on 
American-Iranian Relations !
Background of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Duties of Signatories  !
 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is an international treaty whose officially 
stated purpose is three-fold: (1) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons 
technology, (2) to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and (3) to 
assist with achieving global nuclear and general disarmament.  A total of one hundred 75
and ninety signatories have joined the treaty since it was drafted in 1968. More countries 
adhere to the NPT than any other disarmament agreement, thus establishing the NPT as 
the most significant legal document for defining non-proliferation standards.  The treaty 76
is enforced by the United Nations and recognizes the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council as nuclear-weapons states: the United States, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, France, and China. Though not specified in the NPT, Israel, India, Pakistan, 
and North Korea are also known or believed to have nuclear arsenals. Nuclear states are 
also prohibited by the treaty from transferring weapons or assisting a non-nuclear-weapon 
state with the manufacturing of atomic weapons.  77
 After World War II, along with the emergence of the Cold War, more countries 
began to acquire nuclear weapons. After the United States and the Soviet Union 
championed nuclear armament, other countries began to want the security protection of 
atomic weapons. The United States helped its allies France and Britain acquire nuclear 
weapons to strengthen their security. When West Germany asked for assistance 
developing a nuclear arsenal, both the United States and the Soviet Union became 
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nervous. At the time, there was no treaty in place to regulate the possession or production 
of nuclear arms. A nuclear West Germany, even one who claimed to want nuclear 
weapons for self-defense, could be destabilizing. Germany had started two World Wars, 
and the United States and the Soviet Union worried that nuclear weapons would make it 
easier for Germany to start a third. The United States turned this dilemma into an 
opportunity to orchestrate the non-proliferation movement. The NPT was drafted to 
appease West Germany and to avoid singling it out as the only nation to be denied 
nuclear weapons. West Germany became the leading signatory of the NPT and, in 
exchange for not having nuclear arms, was credited with pioneering the non-proliferation 
movement.    78
 Signatories of the NPT, including West Germany, were originally skeptical of the 
nonproliferation movement and worried it would damage their economies. Ultimately, 
West Germany and others signed the treaty because they “were dependent upon US 
leadership and were ready for a constructive engagement in non-proliferation so long as 
their security and vital economic interests were not negatively affected.”  The NPT was, 79
for many, a bargain that helped them align with the United States, which had emerged as 
a global leader after World War II. In many cases, the United States would provide 
signatories with security guarantees and new technologies to help with peaceful nuclear 
projects.   80
 Since the inception of the NPT, signatories have come to be perceived as 
champions of non-proliferation that are helping keep the world safe from the potentially 
destructive threat of nuclear weapons. The treaty ends with an open invitation to other 
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states to become signatories, encouraging nations to join and commit to non-proliferation. 
Signatories of the NPT, both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapons states, are 
deemed responsible for promoting non-proliferation. Since the treaty opened for 
signature, it has became accepted as an international set of rules for which to protect all 
people from the grave danger of nuclear weapons and global nuclear war. The official 
description of the purpose of the NPT is “to make every effort to avert the danger of such 
a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples….”  One nation's 81
violation of the NPT can be treated as a threat to all of the treaty’s signatories.   82
 Each non-nuclear-weapon state that has signed the treaty has waived its right to 
acquire or manufacture weapons for its own defense.  The NPT requires non-nuclear-83
weapon state signatories to promise not to receive any transfer of nuclear weapons, not to 
manufacture nuclear weapons, and not to seek or receive any assistance in the production 
of nuclear weapons.  The NPT does not, however, prohibit all nuclear activity. 84
Signatories of the NPT have an “inalienable right...to develop research, production and 
use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination.”  A variety of fields 85
benefit from the availability of nuclear technology.  “[F]rom medicine to agriculture to 
industry,” for example, nuclear technology “is used to generate electricity, diagnose 
diseases, treat cancer, and sterilize food and medicine.”  Signatories are also allowed to 86
exchange scientific and technological information that allows for collaboration on and 
development of such peaceful nuclear technologies.  87
  Under the NPT, nations with a nuclear energy program are expected to make the 
details of their program public to the IAEA. The IAEA is a branch of the UN charged 
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with promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and inhibiting its use for any military 
purpose, including nuclear weapons. Iran was one of the earliest signatories of the NPT, 
having signed it in 1968, but has since been accused by the IAEA and the international 
community of violating the treaty’s standards and threatening the security of other states. 
Why Iran May Want Nuclear Weapons 
 Iranian leaders claim that Iran’s nuclear program is within the confines of the NPT 
and will only be used for peaceful purposes to bolster Iran’s economic and technological 
advancement. Perhaps this is true, but there are various reasons why nuclear weapons 
would be a strategic asset to the Islamic Republic. Some of these reasons are concerning 
to the United States. Iran could use nuclear weapons, for example, to gain greater 
leverage against Israel, the most important ally of the United States in the Middle East.  
 The conflict between Israel and Iran primarily consists of hostile rhetoric 
exchanges. The inflammatory statements of Iranian leaders that imply Israel does not 
deserve to be recognized as a state, or exist at all, have led “the Israel state to consider 
self-defense measures that could include a preventive or preemptive strike.”  While 88
Israel’s threats are defensive and not offensive, Iran still might want to be prepared to 
deter Israel. In early 2012, Israel stated that its intelligence officers had evidence that Iran 
was nine months from being able to withstand an Israeli attack. Israel wanted to attack 
Iran to wipe out its nuclear program before the Islamic Republic was capable of making 
nuclear weapons but was eventually persuaded not to, primarily by the United States.  89
Israel refrained from attacking Iran in 2012, but its threat to strike demonstrated that 
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Israel considers Iran a threat and may one day claim self-defense to justify striking the 
Islamic Republic.  
 There are various other ways Iran could use nuclear weapons to undermine 
American influence in the Middle East. Iran has, in the past, adopted various strategies to 
promote its ideals and influence in the region. These include providing “support for 
Islamist terrorist groups, disruption of the Arab-Israeli peace, and undermining US efforts 
in Iraq and Afghanistan.”  If Iran had nuclear weapons, it could give them to Shia 90
terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas to further undermine American interests in 
the Middle East. Because there is no way for the international community to closely 
monitor nuclear weapons that are in the hands of terrorist groups, this could have 
disastrous results for the safety of those targeted by these extremists.  Allowing Iran to 91
achieve its strategic goals in the Middle East could be detrimental to the interests of the 
United States, Israel, and efforts to impede the spread of terrorism. The serious potential 
consequences of a nuclear-armed Iran gives the United States several reasons to pressure 
the Islamic Republic to cease nuclear development.  
A Lack of Transparency and the Origins of Iran’s Nuclear Program 
  The United States and its allies were not always against the idea of a nuclear Iran. 
In 1956, the Shah’s government initiated a series of talks with the government of the 
United States. These talks culminated in the 1957 signing of an agreement between the 
two countries that allowed Iran to begin developing peaceful nuclear energy technologies. 
The Shah ordered the establishment of the first Iranian atomic research center in 1959 at 
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Tehran University, and the United States demonstrated continuing involvement in Iran’s 
industrialization process by donating a five-megawatt research reactor to the university.   92
  After the Iranian Revolution, however, nuclear development slowed down 
significantly in the Islamic Republic for a variety of reasons. For example, most of the 
countries that were helping Iran develop nuclear reactors were wary of the new Islamic 
state, and they ceased to honor the bilateral agreements they had signed with the Shah 
before the revolution. Several nuclear reactors were left unfinished and even more were 
destroyed during the Iran-Iraq War.   93
 The Iran-Iraq War changed the Iranian regime’s opinion on nuclear weapons and 
motivated the Islamic Republic to once again pursue nuclear development. Iran believed 
that modern nuclear technology might allow it to deter Iraq as well as the United States. 
During the war, the United States believed that an Iraqi victory would help balance the 
anti-Western Islamic Republic. The United States deployed the American navy in the 
Persian Gulf to help Iraq fight Iran and to prevent the Islamic Republic from emerging as 
a regional power. The involvement of the United States in the Iran-Iraq war supported 
Iranian perceptions of America as the Great Satan, keen on manipulating Iranian affairs. 
America provided Iraq with arms, diplomatic support, and training for Iraqi soldiers. 
American aid to Iraq was perceived by Iran as evidence that the United States was still 
intent on influencing Iranian affairs and did not support the new Islamic Republic.   94
 During the Shah’s rule, Iran progressed to the point of establishing a civil nuclear 
energy program that could be used to pursue peaceful technologies allowed under the 
NPT.  Towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, Iran signed nuclear 95
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cooperation agreements with various countries, including China and North Korea. This 
was done “to help increase [Iran’s] supply of feedstock and equipment for enriching 
uranium and establish more nuclear reactors...but under IAEA safeguards.”   96
 In 2003 Iran began to draw the attention of the IAEA, which reported that there 
was evidence of an unmonitored diversion of nuclear material from Iran. The IAEA 
demanded that Iran reveal all the details of its nuclear activities and suspend enrichment. 
Iran agreed to these requests as a gesture of good faith.  Iran failed, however, to fully 97
suspend all enrichment activities and obstructed IAEA inspections by not allowing 
inspectors to see all nuclear facilities to verify that they are being used for peaceful 
purposes.  98
  In 2004, Iran signed another deal but continued to defy its agreement with the 
IAEA.  Shortly after President Mohammed Ahmadinejad was inaugurated in 2005, he 99
announced that Iranian nuclear scientists had resumed their work enriching uranium. 
Under his rule, Iran escalated its defiance of the NPT and other international non-
proliferation treaties that had begun in the early years of the twenty-first century. In 1973, 
Iran signed The Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with the IAEA. The goal of a safeguard is to “ensure 
that nuclear material is not diverted for use in the production of nuclear weapons or 
nuclear explosive devices.”  This is done in three ways:  100
 ! (1) implementation of accounting measures to require a country to report all kinds 
 and quantities of fissionable material to the IAEA; (2) enforcement of   
 containment and surveillance measures through the use of seals on nuclear- 
 material containers and filmed or televised recordings of key areas at nuclear  
 facilities to detect the presence of unauthorized material; and (3) the conducting  
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 of inspections to make sure that the declared quantities of nuclear material are  
 where they are declared to be, and that there is no undeclared nuclear material in  
 the country.  101!
 Iran has violated its safeguard with the IAEA in multiple ways, including by 
failing to report nuclear material, facilities, and activities. In 2009, the IAEA discovered a 
nuclear facility on a military base near the city of Qom, southwest of Tehran, believed to 
be capable of housing 3,000 centrifuges.  IAEA investigators also accused Iran of 102
failing to admit possession of sophisticated P2 advanced centrifuges that could 
potentially be used to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons. This is a huge problem for the 
IAEA and its inspectors, who have been unable to access these centrifuges to investigate 
if they are being used to build weapons.  These various failings, referred to collectively 103
as “Iran’s policy of concealment,” show that Iran’s nuclear program lacks transparency.  104
 President Ahmadinejad, who was elected in 2005, believed that the international 
community was “ganging up on Iran” and infringing upon the Islamic Republic’s right 
under the NPT to pursue peaceful nuclear technology.  Iran, however, has failed to 105
prove that its program is intended for peaceful use only. Iranian leaders have refused to 
publicize the details of Iran’s nuclear program and have thus failed to adhere to the 
provisions of the NPT and the nuclear safeguard. This makes it impossible for the IAEA 
to do two things: (1) confirm that Iran’s program will not be used for violent purposes 
such as attacking Israel, and (2) ensure that nuclear technology is not transferred out of 
Iran to terrorist groups or other entities with militaristic intentions. 
 The successful monitoring of nuclear technology gained additional strategic 
importance for the United States after 9/11. For the book The Atlantic Alliance Under 
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Stress: US-European Relations After Iraq, Marc Trachtenberg wrote a chapter entitled 
“The Iraq Crisis and the Future of the Western Alliance.” While his chapter deals with 
Iraq and not Iran, his discussion of the dangers of Iraqi proliferation is applicable to the 
issue of Iran’s nuclear program. In 2002, Vice President Dick Cheney gave a speech 
where he warned that the Iraqi threat was growing and must be dealt with soon. Vice 
President Cheney was one of several politicians who accused of Iraq of continuing to 
build Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) after claiming to have ceased doing so at the 
end of the first Gulf War.  
 Like Iran, Iraq was also accused of working to keep “inspectors in the dark. The 
inspection regime had thus not been able to guarantee that Iraq’s [WMD] had shut down 
permanently.”  Trachtenberg explains that those advocating against the necessity of 106
striking Iraq argued that if Iraq did have nuclear weapons, it would not use them because 
the United States would be able to deter a nuclear strike. While the United States would 
be able to retaliate against an Iraqi nuclear strike, Trachtenberg explains that “direct 
threats would not have been issued, and the operation would have been conducted 
clandestinely, perhaps with a foreign terrorist organization serving as a vehicle of 
attack.”  An indirect attack through a third party would be harder to link back to Iraq to 107
justify American retaliation. Even if solid evidence was found that Iraq was responsible 
for the attack, a counter-strike against a nuclear-armed Iraq would be dangerous.   108
  Since 9/11, the issue of Iran’s nuclear program has grown more urgent as the 
United States has grown increasingly preoccupied with terrorist threats. As with Iraq, the 
United States is concerned that Iran would orchestrate a nuclear attack through a third 
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party. The prospect of a nuclear attack by a third party makes deterrence more difficult 
and complicates America’s defensive strategies. As terrorism has become a prominent 
threat, stopping the nuclear proliferation of certain states has become an integral part of 
the United States’ national security strategy.  
President George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” Speech 
 In his State of the Union address on January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush 
referred to North Korea, Iraq, and Iran as the “Axis of Evil”: “States like these, and their 
terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By 
seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes post a grave and growing danger.”  109
At the time President Bush made this speech, the United States was still reeling from the 
devastating 9/11 attacks. Foreign policymakers were scrambling, trying to figure out what 
to do next.  
 Terrorist groups are a complex and elusive enemy to the United States because 
they are not restricted by geographic borders. President Bush’s comments played to the 
traditional American notions of foreign adversaries. Conflicts between the United States 
and the outside world are frequently constructed and perceived as “clear struggles 
between good and bad forces, even if, as with the world wars (and worldwide 
communism during the Cold War), they actually were complicated multilateral affairs 
with varieties of interests within the warring coalitions.”  Within President Bush’s 110
definition of Axis of Evil, the complex organizations and power dynamics involved in the 
War on Terror disappear. The Axis of Evil speech was an attempt to restructure the 
American understanding of the War on Terror. By citing specific nations, President Bush 
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created a dynamic that fit traditional American notions of conflict: in the War on Terror 
nations can either be good or be evil.  Nations are either supporters of terrorism and 111
against the United States, or against terrorism and with the United States.  According to 112
President Bush, any nation that fell within the former category had to face punitive 
action.  
 President Bush demonized the three states in the Axis by explaining the ways in  
which their governments failed to uphold democratic values and threatened to disrupt the 
peace of both the United States and American allies.  His speech portrayed countries 113
with links to terrorism as threats that the United States could and would protect itself 
against. The Islamic Republic fit perfectly within the Axis of Evil metaphor because Iran 
was already viewed as an adversary of the United States. The media coverage of the 
hostage crisis had perpetuated the narrative that Iranian religious fanatics had captured 
innocent American civilians, and President Bush built on these preconceived notions of 
the Islamic Republic.  
 In his speech President Bush said, “Iran aggressively pursues [weapons of mass 
destruction] and exports terror, while an un-elected few repress the Iranian people’s hope 
for freedom.”  He critiqued the Islamic Republic’s failure to uphold its duty as a nation 114
state to promote non-proliferation and fight terrorism. President Bush demonized Iran by 
saying, not just that Iran sponsors terrorism, but also by implying that the Islamic regime 
is against democracy. President Bush saw Iran as a non-democratic state-sponsor of 
terrorism, a severe danger to American values and interests, at home and abroad.  Iran’s 115
failure to adhere to the standards of the NPT further supports President Bush’s assertion 
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that Iran intends to harm the United States and its allies. Believing Iran is trying to 
conceal violent intentions leads to the conclusion that Iran is a dangerous, irrational 
nation, that must face defensive, punitive action rather than be engaged with diplomacy. 
Iran’s Indignation and the Continued Elusiveness of Diplomacy 
 To Iran, President Bush’s Axis of Evil speech was nonsensical. Before President 
Bush made his comments, Iranian-American relations had been improving. In March 
2000, Madeleine Albright publicly apologized for the United States’ involvement in the 
1953 coup against Mossadeq. Iran subsequently reached out to the United States after 
9/11. The Islamic Republic expressed a deep interest in helping the United States 
overthrow the Taliban and “envisaged a new geopolitical role in Afghanistan and Central 
Asia, in alliance with the United States.”  President Bush crushed any chance the United 116
States and Iran had to repair diplomatic relations. He categorized regimes in black and 
white terms, as either against the United States or with the United States, as either evil or 
not evil. The Axis of Evil speech “was a slap in the face to those who trusted the USA” 
and supported Iran’s offers to help the United States in Afghanistan.   117
  Because the Axis of Evil speech triggered a wave of anti-American sentiment in 
Iran, President Ahmadinejad was able to use anti-Western rhetoric to help him win the 
election in 2005. By defeating the moderate former president Ali Akbar Hashemi 
Rasfanjani, President Ahmadinejad changed the political landscape of Iran. His campaign 
harkened back to one of the key bases of the Iranian Revolution, the rejection of 
American domination and the Great Satan, and his election “tilted the balance of Iran’s 
foreign policy from cooperation to confrontation.”  A political hardliner, President 118
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Ahmadinejad frequently stated his intention to promote Iran’s interests and protect the 
Islamic Republic from the oppression of the United States and Western influences.  The 119
Axis of Evil speech angered Iranians, made politicians unwilling to engage the United 
States in diplomacy, and prompted President Ahmadinejad to continue Iran’s nuclear 
program as a sign of defiance against America. 
Conclusion: Path Dependency Continues 
 President Bush’s policy for Iran focused on damaging the country’s ability to 
proliferate. The Bush administration impeded the economic growth of Iran through 
actions like extending the Iran Libya Sanctions Act by five years. The purpose of the 
sanctions—which punished firms that did business with Iran or Libya—was to decrease 
development of Iran’s oil and gas industries so as to hurt the Islamic Republic’s economy 
and diminish its ability to finance nuclear development. President Bush even attacked 
President Ahmadinejad through more symbolic acts—for example, by criminalizing the 
members of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, one of the Iranian president’s most significant 
constituencies.  120
 President Bush used President Ahmadinejad’s controversial politics, including the 
continuation of Iran’s nuclear program, to defend his decision to contain rather than 
engage Iran.  After the 9/11 attacks, Iran offered to help President Bush fight the War on 121
Terror. Specifically, Iran wanted to aid the United States in overthrowing the Taliban in 
Afghanistan. President Bush was faced with a choice: he could accept Iran’s assistance 
and begin the process of overcoming decades of hostility between the two countries, or 
he could refuse the offer. 
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 An important element of path dependency is inflexibility, meaning “the farther 
into the process we are, the harder it becomes to shift from one path to another.”  When 122
President Bush entered office, more than twenty years had passed without a diplomatic 
relationship between the United States and the Islamic Republic. American policymakers 
were unfamiliar with the potential consequences of a new Iran policy that involved 
engagement rather than containment. Engaging Iran, which was known to sponsor 
terrorist groups, be hostile towards Israel, and have leaders who gave speeches 
condemning America as the Great Satan, was an unfamiliar strategy fraught with risk.  123
Certain politicians and policymakers believed that Iran was constructing nuclear weapons 
to gain power in the Middle East by attacking America’s allies, including Israel. Others 
feared another attack like 9/11 and worried that Iran was searching for a way to have a 
nuclear bomb reach the United States. Seeking rapprochement with Iran was condemned 
as a mistake, one that could encourage the Islamic Republic “to rise” and fight to extend 
Iranian influence at the cost of American interests.   124
  In his discussion of how domestic politics influence international negotiations, 
Putnam explains that the size of win-sets is determined, in part, by the cost of “no-
agreement, [which] often represents the status quo.”  If the cost of no-agreement is low, 125
a country becomes less  motivated to pursue international agreements and diplomacy 
becomes more evasive.  The continued absence of diplomatic agreements with Iran was 126
a safe scenario for the Bush administration to pursue. Attempting to renew diplomatic ties 
would have been difficult and risky. A lack of diplomacy with Iran was a familiar 
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situation to the United States and even offered immediate domestic political benefits to 
President Bush. 
 When he made his Axis of Evil speech, President Bush was speaking to an 
American public that was confused and afraid. In the past, the United States had been 
involved in conflicts with nation-states that were defined by clear borders. How could 
terrorism be combatted when the government was unable to even locate terrorist groups 
or their leaders, such as Osama Bin Laden? President Bush’s Axis of Evil speech framed 
the War on Terror as a conflict involving the United States and any nation known to 
support terrorism. He did so in order to appear as a leader who understood the threats 
facing the United States and was willing to take action to defend America’s safety and 
ideals.  127
 President Bush’s speech, by spurring anti-American feelings in Iran, helped 
President Ahmadinejad win his campaign on the promise of standing up to the United 
States. The speech also motivated President Ahmadinejad to continue spouting anti-
American rhetoric after he was elected. President Ahmadinejad claimed that Iran had 
reached out a hand to President Bush after 9/11 and that President Bush rejected it in 
order to attack Iran’s right to a nuclear program.  President Ahmadinejad saw President 128
Bush’s actions as a violation to Iran’s right under the NPT to pursue peaceful nuclear 
technology. Iran, however, made no effort to allow the United States to verify President 
Ahmadinejad’s promises.      129
 President Bush and President Ahmadinejad trapped their respective countries in 
an antagonistic loop. Both leaders were motivated by domestic politics to act in a way 
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that supported path dependency. Each time the United States refused to engage Iran, the 
refusal spurred anti-American sentiment in the Islamic Republic, which in turn enhanced 
the belief in the United States that the Islamic Republic is a dangerous “rogue” nation. 
The tension between President Bush and President Ahmadinejad impacted President 
Obama’s decision to use policies of containment, including sanctions, to try and prevent 
both Iran and its allies from dominating the balance of power in the Middle East. 
!
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Chapter Four: President Barack Obama’s Dilemmas 
Relations With Iran at the Beginning of the Obama Administration 
 When President Barack Obama was sworn into office in January 2009, Iran was 
in the midst of choosing who would next be president. This coinciding of elections led to 
the optimistic belief that the United States and Iran could start repairing their relationship. 
The hope was that Iran would be willing to engage President Obama because he could 
offer America and the Islamic Republic a fresh start.  
 As the newly elected president, President Obama had a plan for his Iran policy 
that was full of promise and that stood in sharp contrast to the confrontational politics of 
his predecessor, President George W. Bush. “Iran would be a symbolic corrective to 
Bush’s approach to addressing international crises, which was heavy on pressure and light 
on diplomacy.”  President Obama’s goal was to launch a diplomatic initiative that would 130
culminate in a deal between Iran and the international community regarding Iran’s 
nuclear program. With the help of his advisors, President Obama drafted a campaign to 
engage Iran that “entailed public appeals, back-channel communications, and forays at 
negotiations.”  Unfortunately, President Obama’s early attempts to bring Iran to the 131
negotiating table made little headway, and his plan of engagement was put on the back 
burner completely after the 2009 presidential elections in Iran. 
  Despite his original success in winning over the Iranian people when first elected 
in 2005, President Mohammed Ahmadinejad’s popularity ultimately experienced a 
downturn. He had numerous policies that contributed to the decimation of the Iranian 
economy. He dismantled the Plan and Budget Organization, which manages the 
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government’s budget, and the Money and Credit Association, which sets monetary policy. 
In 2007, President Ahmadinejad fired the industry minister and the oil minster, sending 
both ministries spiraling into crises. President Ahmadinejad increased inflation by 
“lowering interest rates for poorer borrowers, canceling some debt of farmers, and 
increasing social welfare payments and subsidies.”  The lack of government 132
infrastructure, combined with international sanctions that already made Iran look 
unappealing to foreign investors, left Iran’s economy mismanaged and in shambles. As 
President Ahmadinejad’s presidency progressed, his policies created a rift in Iranian 
politics. While the affluent and urbanite sectors of Iran condemned President 
Ahmadinejad for increasing inflation, poorer Iranians perceived President Ahmadinejad’s 
actions as evidence that the president was attentive to their economic plight.   133
  Iran was also divided over President Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy. Certain 
leaders, including Ayatollah Khamenei, applauded President Ahmadinejad’s defiance of 
the international community. The Ayatollah publicly praised President Ahmadinejad for 
defying the United States and upholding the revolutionary ideal that Iran’s economy must 
be free from dependence on foreign nations and entities. Other Iranian leaders and 
portions of the population expressed concern that President Ahmadinejad’s was isolating 
the Islamic Republic by defying the United Nations and the international community on 
various issues, including Iran’s nuclear program. This group of less conservative Iranians 
was growing concerned that Iran, due to its severe economic decline, could not afford to 
remain isolated from the United States and its allies. To the moderate Iranian, President 
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Ahmadinejad’s frequent meetings with anti-United States figures such as Venezuela’s 
Hugo Chavez were more harmful than they were strategic.  134
 Although he lost the support of many Iranians, due to his economic and foreign 
policies, President Ahmadinejad was reelected in 2009 with 62.6 percent of the vote. 
President Ahmadinejad was accused by many Iranians of stealing the presidency from the 
more moderate Mir-Hossein Musavi, who officially received 33.75% of the vote. After 
the results were announced, Musavi supporters flooded the streets to protest the election. 
These outraged voters cited the following evidence to support their claim that President 
Ahmadinejad did not rightfully win the presidency: “the infeasibility of counting 40 
million votes so quickly; the barring of candidate observers at many polling stations; 
regime-shut-down of internet and text services; and repression of postelection 
protests.”  The protestors hoped that Ayatollah Khamenei would annul the elections, but 135
their hopes diminished when the Ayatollah held a prayer sermon on June 19 to refute 
allegations of voter fraud and then threatened to crackdown on future protests. The next 
day, state media reported that at least ten protestors had been killed. A total of about 
2,500 protestors were arrested at the height of the crackdown. In late October 2009, one 
hundred remained in jail and at least eight protest figures were condemned to death by 
the government.  136
  President Obama wanted to initiate a policy of engagement with Iran that 
balanced non-interference in Iranian affairs with preserving the primary goal of reaching 
a deal over Iran’s nuclear program. The 2009 political turmoil in the Islamic Republic 
complicated President Obama’s Iran policy, leaving him trapped between two sides of 
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Iranian politics. If President Obama engaged the opposition movement, he would isolate 
the Iranian government, the only entity that could participate in negotiations on Iran’s 
nuclear program. Negotiating with President Ahmadinejad and his government, however, 
would also be problematic for President Obama. Several allies of the United States, 
including France, Britain, and Germany, had harshly criticized Iran’s crackdowns against 
protestors. A joint statement issued at the G-8 Summit meeting, held in Italy in July 2009, 
criticized Iran’s treatment of protestors.  To engage President Ahmadinejad and his 137
government would require diplomacy with a leader known for his provocative statements 
and a government that had been internationally condemned. President Obama’s 
administration began to default to punitive action. Deterred by regional politics and the 
rhetoric of President Ahmadinejad, President Obama’s Iran strategy began to mirror that 
of his predecessor in many ways.  138
 Following President Obama’s election, the UN Security Council plus Germany 
(P5+1) invited Iran to partake in negotiations over Iran’s nuclear programs. Publicly, 
President Obama pledged to Iran’s leaders that he wanted to cooperate with them, but his 
actions at both the domestic and international level sent a different message: “in the 
aftermath of the disputed 2009 elections in Iran and the violence that followed, the focus 
of the debate in Washington soon shifted back toward punitive measures.”  President 139
Obama filled his cabinet with people who were hardliners with their approach to Iran, 
meaning they supported using harsh measures to try to force Iran to abandon its nuclear 
program. Stuart Levy, a neoconservative lawyer who spearheaded Bush’s sanctions 
policy, retained his position as undersecretary of the treasury for terrorism and financial 
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intelligence. Hillary Clinton, who was firmly against the Iranian government and an avid 
supporter of Israel, was appointed Secretary of State.  
 Regarding international negotiations, President Obama has rejected various 
Iranian amendments to proposed deals. At the 2009 talks, for example, the P5+1 “made a 
new proposal in which most of Iran’s low-enriched uranium would be shipped to Russia 
for processing to 20 per cent enrichment and then on to France for processing into fuel 
rods before being returned to Iran.”  With this deal, Iran would get fuel for its research 140
reactors, and the United States would get the low-enriched uranium out of Iran. This 
would create more time for negotiations without the threat of Iran pursuing serious 
nuclear technology, and possibly nuclear weapons.  Iranian conservatives, furious at the 141
idea of surrendering Iranian nuclear technology and bowing down to the will of 
foreigners, pressured President Ahmadinejad to make a counterproposal. President 
Ahmadinejad asked to have a simultaneous rather than sequential exchange of low-
enriched uranium for fuel. President Obama refused to accept the counterproposal. He 
said that the original proposal could not be modified, and the talks stalled.   142
 Tehran had hoped that President Obama would be more willing to accept the idea 
of a nuclear Iran. The combination of President Obama’s hardline cabinet appointments 
and his inflexibility with regards to international negotiations with Iran turned politicians 
in Tehran into skeptics. His actions failed to match his promises to engage the Iranians. 
President Bush’s refusal to negotiate with Tehran directly and his preoccupation with Iraq 
had given Iran time to develop more advanced nuclear technology without scrutiny.  143
While President Bush punished Iran with economic sanctions, Iran continued to work 
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towards perfecting the nuclear fuel cycle. In September 2009, President Obama and 
French and British leaders revealed that intelligence indicated Iran was developing a 
uranium enrichment site on a Revolutionary Guard base near Qom, and the site appeared 
unsuitable for purely civilian use.  When President Obama took office in 2009, he was 144
facing not just a confrontational Iran, but also an emboldened one with increasingly more 
sophisticated technology. President Obama underestimated the Iranians, and now had to 
find a way to contain Iranian proliferation before it was too late.  
Iran, the Gulf States, and the Risks of a Grand Bargain 
 Iran’s foreign policy is rooted in the ideology of the Islamic Revolution and 
functions to promote Iran’s national interests. “Some interpret Iran’s objectives as the 
overturning of the power structure in the Middle East, which Iran believes favors the 
United States, Israel, and their ‘collaborators’-Sunni Muslim regimes such as Egypt, 
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.”  Iran is the largest and most powerful country in the Middle 145
East and has a dominant Shia Muslim population. The vast majority of the other Muslim 
countries in the region have prominently Sunni Muslim populations. The difference 
between Sunnis and Shias dates back to the death in 632 of Islam’s founder, the Prophet 
Mohammed. The majority of Muslims backed Abu Bakr, a friend of the Prophet and 
father of his wife Aisha, and became the Sunni sect. The rest thought Muhammad’s kin 
were the rightful successors and became the Shia sect. While all Muslims agree that Allah 
is the only God and Mohammad the only messenger, Shias see their ayatollahs as 
reflections of God on earth, which has led Sunnies to accuse Shias of heresy.   146
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  A significant component of Iran’s regional policy is its relationship with the 
kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which has opposing influences and interests in the Middle 
East. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia are ruled by religious governments, and Islam is the 
base of each country’s set of laws and methods of governing. Saudi Arabia sees itself as 
the leader of the Sunni Muslim world and is alarmed by Iran’s attempts to increase its 
Shia influence in the region.  While Saudi Arabia’s leaders have refrained from publicly 147
supporting military action against Iran, the kingdom has made several subtle protests 
against Iran’s burgeoning influence. Saudi Arabia does not support Iraq’s Shia prime 
minister Nuri al-Maliki, who has ties to Iran after having lived there during his period of 
exile, and repeatedly raises past issues involving Iran. For example, Saudi Arabia blames 
Iran for instigating violent demonstrations at annual Hajj pilgrimages to Mecca in the 
1980s and 1990s. Iran claims this is untrue, but Saudi Arabia has not retracted its 
accusations.  148
 The states that form the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) with Saudi Arabia—the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and Kuwait—vary with regard to 
their opinions on how to approach Iran. The Sultan of Oman, for example, is closest 
politically to Iran and has refused to criticize Iranian policies or support policies that 
isolate Iran. The Sunni ruling family in Bahrain, on the other hand, refuses to engage Iran 
and has repeatedly accused the Iranian government of supporting Shia dissidents in 
Bahrain.  Despite these variances, the GCC functions as a political block which 149
primarily adheres to Saudi Arabian politics and seeks to constrain Iranian influence in the 
Middle East whenever possible. The Gulf states disagree on how to engage Tehran 
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politically. Because of their proximity to the Islamic Republic, however, they agree on the 
importance of preventing an emboldened Iran from emerging and instigating an Arab-
Persian conflict.  150
 One of the options available to President Obama is a grand bargain with Iran, 
which would entail offering Iran “a series of concessions, including normalised relations, 
security guarantees, a more central role in Gulf politics and recognition of its right to a 
fuel cycle….”  Washington would do this in exchange for a promise that Iran would 151
adhere to the IAEA’s monitoring conditions to prove the Islamic Republic has not 
developed nuclear weapons capability.  A bargain would likely appease Iran by 152
accepting Iran’s one non-negotiable demand, the right to a nuclear fuel cycle under the 
NPT. The concern is that a deal with Iran has the potential to alienate GCC states, several 
of whom, particularly Saudi Arabia, are important allies of the United States.  153
 GCC states are concerned about the various possible consequences of a nuclear-
armed Iran. Such consequences include, but are not limited to, “a nuclear accident, a 
regional nuclear arms race and, above all, an emboldened Iranian effort to achieve 
regional hegemony.”  Each of these outcomes has the potential to disrupt the balance of 154
power between the Sunni ruled Gulf states and Shia Iran. Even though a grand bargain 
might encourage Iran to make its nuclear activities more transparent, the Gulf states are 
uncomfortable with President Obama giving Tehran a larger and more influential role in 
regional affairs and “granting Iran the hegemonic position it craves.”   155
 The GCC would likely respond to a grand bargain with Iran in a manner that 
could potentially be detrimental to American interests. The fear of being isolated by a 
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United States-Iran deal would cause the GCC to become more accommodating to Tehran. 
This would not be problematic if the grand bargain worked. But if President Obama’s 
gamble were to fail, “Washington would find its ability to restore a regime of containment 
and sanctions, or to pursue a military option, greatly undermined.”  The GCC would 156
likely hesitate to become involved in punitive action after feeling that its interests had 
been sacrificed to pursue a deal with Iran. President Obama has thus far avoided a grand 
bargain because engaging President Ahmadinejad, a confrontational president easily 
influenced by Iranian conservatives, is a great risk. The potential price of failure—
upsetting important regional allies and damaging the possibility of future containment 
pursuits—is too high.      
Israel’s Fears and the Pressures to use Military Force 
 America’s most significant ally in the region, Israel, sees Iran’s possession of 
nuclear weapons as a direct and immediate threat. President Ahmadinejad, keeping with 
his habit of engaging in confrontational politics, was known for his tirades against Israel. 
In 2005, President Ahmadinejad spoke at a program entitled “A World Without Zionism,” 
which was attended by about 4,000 students in preparation for an annual anti-Israel 
demonstration on the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan. It was at the rally that 
President Ahmadinejad made what is perhaps his most provocative and famous statement, 
publicly declaring his agreement with the Ayatollah’s remarks that Israel must be “wiped 
off the map.”  Translators said a more accurate interpretation of President 157
Ahmadinejad’s remark is that Israel would collapse, a less violent sentiment. The  
translators’ comments were lost in a wave of hysteria that swept across Israel in reaction 
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to the Holocaust denying Iranian president. The statement “wiped off the map” spread and 
became accepted as an accurate representation of Iranian views towards Israel.  For 158
many people in the Jewish nation, the threat of a nuclear Iran is too great of a risk to 
waste efforts negotiating a grand bargain. Israel maintains that “a deterrence relationship 
with Iran is not possible because the Iranian leadership is not rational.” The phrase 
“wiped off the map” was evidence for Israel that Iran is threatening and irrational. 
 Even Israeli politicians who are more optimistic about diplomacy with Iran 
oppose the idea of a nuclear Iran because of the consequences this would pose for Israel’s 
regional position. Hezbollah, a militant Lebanese group with anti-Israeli tendencies, is 
sponsored by Iran and could be encouraged to attack Israel under the protection of a 
nuclear Islamic Republic. A nuclear Iran could also be detrimental to Israel’s diplomatic 
efforts. Arab states such as Egypt, Jordan, and Palestine, compelled to adhere to the 
demands of a powerful, nuclear Iran, might abandon peace talks with Israel.    159
 After President Obama’s election in 2008, the Israeli National Security Council 
outlined two possible diplomatic developments that could hurt Israel. In his book, Parsi 
explains that these developments are “a U.S. initiated dialogue leading to a 
rapprochement between Iran, the United States, and the Arab world, or the U.S. building 
a wide international coalition against Iran for which Israel might be forced to pay a 
price.”  Diplomacy between the United States and Iran could impact Israel because of 160
the “risk of diverging American and Israeli redlines on the nuclear issue.”  Israel 161
believes that once Iran understands the mechanisms of building and controlling a nuclear 
fuel cycle, Iran can and will weaponize at any moment. Consequently, Israel believes that 
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Iran’s nuclear program must be stopped as soon as possible so that there is no risk of Iran 
reaching the “redline” of producing weapons-grade enriched uranium. To Israel, 
cooperative diplomacy between the United States and Iran risks giving the Iranians more 
time to master their knowledge of the nuclear fuel cycle.  162
 President Obama’s initial attempts to engage Iran were concerning to Israel, 
whose leaders wanted Iran to have zero-enrichment capabilities. Since Iran has showed 
no signs of sacrificing its uranium enrichment program, Israel has come to believe that 
the only way to stop Iran is through the threat or use of force. Israel began pressuring the 
United States to use military force against Iran in the spring of 2008 but President Bush, 
well into his last year as president, had no interest in starting another conflict in the 
Middle East. In 2009, during President Obama’s first year, Israeli policymakers made 
great efforts to pressure the United States into attacking Iran or at least providing Israel 
with the military support necessary to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities.  163
 A military strike against Iran is risky and would have various, perhaps severe, 
consequences. The military option is an all or nothing choice and while it might destroy 
Iran’s nuclear facilities, it would certainly destroy any possibility for engagement. If the 
military strike were to fail, the United States would face an enraged Iran that could not be 
assuaged through diplomatic avenues. The use of force by the United States would anger 
moderate Iranian politicians who had been more receptive to negotiations.  Despite 164
these likely consequences, Israel has continued to pressure the United States to attack 
Iran, believing it will not be safe until Iran’s nuclear program ends.  Throughout his 165
first term, President Obama’s Iran policy was frozen by his wariness to upset regional 
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politics. It seemed that no matter what path President Obama may have chosen regarding 
Iran, a regional ally would be unhappy with his final decision. 
Conclusion: What Can President Barack Obama Do? 
 When he took office, President Obama was determined to engage Iran and come 
up with a mutually agreeable way to delay, and eventually end, Iran’s nuclear program. 
President Bush’s policy of non-engagement fueled anti-American sentiment and 
encouraged Iran to continue nuclear development. The Islamic Republic ultimately 
proved too important to ignore: “its geostrategic location, vast oil and gas reserves, and 
significant influence on public opinion in the Muslim world, and especially the Shia part 
of it, all conspire against America being able to act as though the Islamic Republic does 
not exist.”  President Bush refused to engage the Persian nation, thereby eliminating the 166
possibility that Iran could help promote American interests in Afghanistan and, perhaps, 
elsewhere. President Obama’s initial strategy was the opposite of that of his predecessor, 
and he hoped to further the United States’ position in the Middle East through 
cooperation, not through confrontation.   167
 When Iran reelected President Ahmadinejad, President Obama’s plans to engage 
Iran fell apart. He was hesitant to negotiate with a president who had threatened Israel 
and been condemned for his crackdown on protestors through an official joint statement 
at a G-8 Summit meeting.  As he struggled to adopt a new Iran policy, President 168
Obama’s subsequent actions did little to change the nature of American-Iranian relations. 
Political actors often make choices that support path dependency because of “the strong 
status quo bias associated with the decision rules that govern most political 
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institutions.”  President Obama chose to uphold the status quo of American-Iranian 169
relations when he rejected a fuel swap deal with the Islamic Republic in 2009. Unsure of 
what the consequences would be if he engaged President Ahmadinejad, President Obama 
chose policies with familiar outcomes until he could figure out the best way to approach 
the controversial Iranian president 
 Once it became clear that engagement would not have been as easy as he hoped, 
and the fuel-swap deal fell apart, President Obama continued to struggle to decide how to 
approach the Islamic Republic. He could bargain with Iran and offer the Islamic nation 
some sort of consolation in exchange for limiting nuclear development. Alternatively, he 
could try to eliminate Iran’s nuclear program through a military strike. Both options are 
far from perfect, and each would lead to a series of consequences that could upset the 
current political balance in the Middle East.  
 When analyzing the relationship between domestic politics and international 
negotiations, Putnam explains that domestic groups behave differently from national 
governments. The former pursue their own interests and try to increase their chances of 
reelection by pressuring the government to adopt the policies their constituents favor. The 
latter seek to satisfy domestic pressures while simultaneously “minimizing the 
consequences of adverse foreign developments.” A politician involved in a two-level 170
game, as Putnam puts it, must avoid upsetting both foreign contingents at the negotiating 
table and domestic groups in his home country. Angering a key player in global 
negotiations could damage chances for successful diplomacy, while failure to respect the 
interests of domestic groups could result in a decline in popularity and the loss of a 
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politician’s position.  Within Putnam’s definition of win-sets, President Obama must 171
create a policy that satisfies both Iran and domestic constituents. 
 Putnam discusses how domestic constituents impact international negotiations, 
but there is an additional entity that can impact negotiations. Negotiating a deal over 
Iran’s nuclear program is a multi-level game, one that involves not just domestic 
constituents but also regional allies of the United States. President Obama must keep in 
mind how these third-parties will react because whatever he chooses to do will affect the 
United States’ relationship with their allies. A lasting agreement with Iran will account for 
the win-sets of countries such as Saudi Arabia and Israel, who have close ties to the 
United States and are also invested in the outcome of negotiations over the Iranian 
nuclear program. 
 President Obama’s policy towards Iran is trapped between cooperation and 
confrontation. Cooperation with Iran would anger some of America’s most important 
allies. Confrontation would be supported by Israel and other countries, but would damage 
America’s diplomatic capabilities. As his presidency has progressed, President Obama 
has tried several times to create an Iran policy that balances engagement with 
containment. Negotiations with Iran have been difficult for President Obama because he 
has struggled to create a policy that satisfies all of the key players: Iran, regional allies, 
and domestic constituents. Whether or not he can create a policy that slows or stops 
nuclear development and allows him to avoid choosing between bargaining and a military 
intervention remains to be seen.  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Chapter Five: The Constraints of  American Domestic Politics and the Limitations of 
Sanctions !
America’s Special Relationship With Israel 
 Israel is a prosperous country, with a per capita income ranked twenty-fifth largest 
in the world as of 2012. Since 1976, the United States has given more money to Israel 
than any other recipient of American aid. United States’ aid to Israel drastically increased 
after the 1973 Yom Kippur War between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Syria 
and Egypt. Israel now receives about three billion dollars a year in direct foreign 
assistance from the United States, roughly one-fifth of America’s foreign aid budget. 
American aid to Israel contains many special allowances. Israel is the only country that 
receives all of its aid at the beginning of the fiscal year as opposed to quarterly 
installments, and therefore earns extra interest money. Israel is allowed to use roughly 
twenty-five percent of its aid allotment to subsidize its own defense industry and does not 
have to account for how that aid is spent. This exemption allows Israel to use the aid “for 
purposes the United States opposes, like building settlements in the West Bank.”     172
 Israel gets consistent, usually unconditional, diplomatic backing from the United 
States in regional disputes. This means the United States supports Israel even when Israel 
does things the United States opposes, such as increasing occupation in Palestinian 
territories.  The United States has vetoed more than thirty United Nations Security 173
Council Resolutions that were critical of Israel. Arab nations have attempted to have 
Israel’s nuclear arsenal placed on the IAEA’s watch list, only to be blocked by the United 
States. America has come to Israel’s rescue during times of crisis, going back to when 
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President Richard Nixon supplied Israel with arms during the Yom Kippur War. More 
recently, President George W. Bush took Israel’s side during the 2007 war with Lebanon, 
opposing calls for a ceasefire in order to give Israel another chance to go after 
Hezbollah.  174
 Judging by Israel’s economic status, American aid is based on politics rather than 
charity. During the Cold War, Israel was a strategic asset to America and helped contain 
Soviet expansion the Middle East. The American-Israeli partnership, however, has not 
always been equally beneficial to the United States. For example, the partnership has 
complicated the United States’ relationship with the Arab world. President Nixon’s 
decision to provide $2.2 billion in aid during the Yom Kippur War triggered an Arab oil 
embargo. In addition, Israel’s military is not strong enough to protect American interests 
in the Middle East. During the Islamic Revolution, Israel was unable to provide military 
support to protect Persian Gulf oil supplies. At times, Israel has even been a strategic 
burden. During the first Gulf War, the United States was unable to use Israeli bases  
because doing so would anger the Arab anti-Iraq coalition. The same thing happened 
again in 2003 when President Bush chose not to use Israeli bases out of fear of Arab 
opposition.   175
 Despite these strategic consequences, American leaders have sought to maintain 
the United States’ partnership with Israel. In the Middle East, where politics are complex 
and the opinions of countries on America feel like they change daily, Israel is a consistent 
ally. Particularly after 9/11, American “support for Israel has been justified by the claim 
that both states are threatened by terrorist groups originating in the Arab or Muslim 
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World, and by a set of ‘rogue states’ that back these groups and seek [weapons of mass 
destruction].”  Iran is one of the “rogue states” that is a threat to both the United States 176
and Israel. President Ahmadinejad’s tirades against Israel have been perceived as 
evidence of an ideological clash between the Jewish nation and the Islamic Republic. As 
Parsi explains: 
 On one side was Israel, portrayed as a democracy in a region beset by   
 authoritarianism and an eastern outpost of Enlightenment rationalism. On the  
 other side was the Islamic Republic of Iran, viewed as a hidebound clerical  
 regime whose rejection of the West and aspiration to speak for Muslims   
 everywhere were symbolized by its refusal to recognize Israel’s right to exist. !177!
But framing the tensions between Israel and Iran as a conflict of ideals negates the history 
of strategic cooperation between the two countries.  Israel and Iran worked together 
during the Cold War in order to further the mutual goal of preventing Soviet expansion. 
During the Iran-Iraq War, Israel provided arms to Iran because an Iraqi victory would 
threaten Israel’s position in the region. An Arab alliance with Iraq could have easily 
allowed Iraq to pass through Jordan and threaten Israel’s eastern front.   178
 The shift in Iranian-Israeli relations from cooperation to open hostility resulted 
from  the sweeping geopolitical changes that slammed the Middle East in the early 1990s. 
Iraq’s defeat in the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated the threats 
that Iran and Israel shared. Iraq was no longer balancing Iran, which was left unchecked 
in a new security environment. This and the ambiguity of Israel’s strategic utility to the 
United States after the collapse of the Soviet Union made Israel profoundly worried.   179
 Israel, acting on its worries, has used the United States’ path-dependent 
relationship with Iran to its advantage. American politicians are predisposed to accept and 
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perpetuate the idea that the Islamic Republic is a threat. Iranian citizens executed a direct 
attack against American citizens during the hostage crisis, and Iran continues to threaten 
America’s relationship with its Arab allies. After 9/11, when American ideals were 
deemed to be under attack, it was easy for Israel to perpetuate the notion that Iran was a 
threat to the promotion of democracy in the Middle East. Israel consistently pressures the 
United States to implement harsh measures against Iran, and Washington follows suit 
with the hope of restraining the Islamic Republic.  Iran, however, has not been 180
restrained. There is growing evidence that Iran’s nuclear program is continuing to expand, 
including the facilities discovered at Qom. In order to appease domestic constituents who 
worry about the ideological threat of the Islamic Republic, Washington still promotes 
containment despite evidence that suggests this policy is not working. 
The Logic and Impact of Sanctions 
 Under President Bush, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice devised the use of a 
dual-track policy with Iran in order to achieve an end to the Iranian nuclear program. 
Dual-track policy is a political strategy in which once country imposes penalties against 
another country while simultaneously remaining open to negotiations. Secretary Rice 
proposed implementing sanctions against Iran while also making it clear that the United 
States would be willing to lift them in exchange for Iranian concessions over its nuclear 
program. Washington, however, remained weary of talks and did not invest energy into 
the negotiation facet of Rice’s dual-track policy.   181
 President Bush wanted a punitive course of action that would satisfy regional 
allies who were also concerned about Iran, including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
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Emirates, and Israel. Sanctions signaled that the United States would not accept the idea 
of a nuclear Iran and was willing to take tough action against the Islamic Republic. 
Sanctions also allowed President Bush to be aggressive towards Iran without actually 
starting a war. This is part of why the Obama administration has also continued to rely on 
sanctions when dealing with Iran. With sanctions, President Obama can avoid the choice 
between bargaining and war. Sanctions are punitive action that encourage Iran to engage 
the United States. To receive sanctions relief, Iran has to respect the demands of the 
United States. This dynamic is appealing to American domestic entities who do not want 
concessions to be given to the Islamic Republic. While sanctions effectively cause short-
term economic damage to the sanctioned country, their long-term consequences are 
limited.  182
Economic Effects of Sanctions 
 The United States has issued two types of economic penalties against Iran since 
the Islamic Revolution: trade sanctions and financial sanctions. Trade sanctions are 
penalties that severely limit Iran’s ability to trade with the United States. One of the 
biggest trade sanctions issued against Iran was Executive Order 12959, imposed by 
President Bill Clinton on May 6, 1995. This Order banned all United States trade with 
and investment in Iran. The ban was intended to “blunt criticism that U.S. trade with Iran 
made U.S. appeals for multilateral containment of Iran less credible.”  Only food and 183
medical supplies can be provided to Iran, and only on a case-by-case basis.  Every March 
since 1995, the current presidential administration has renewed the ban. Additional 
legislation has also been issued that extends the impact of the original order to other 
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foreign entities. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act, 
for example, mandates sanctions on foreign firms that invest threshold amounts in Iran’s 
energy sector.   184
 Financial sanctions, which limit the amount of money that Iran receives, are 
trickier to implement since supranational entities are involved in regulating international 
finances. The United States has directly by implementing “financial measures deprived 
Iran from financing by the Export-Import bank, export credits, loan guarantee and export 
insurance.”  Indirectly, the United States instructs its representatives at international 185
financial institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to 
vote against any form of financial assistance to Iran. Financial sanctions impede Iran’s 
ability to borrow funds and to finance oil development projects.  186
  The total cost of sanctions, both trade and financial, varies slightly each year but 
tends to be rather high: “the sanctions introduced against Iran as part of the dispute over 
Tehran’s nuclear program cost the country over $40 billion in export revenues in 2012 or 
about $3.4 billion per month, according to [the] International Energy Agency.”  Trade 187
and financial sanctions have succeeded in damaging Iran’s economy, but their political 
effects have been minimal. 
Political Effects of Sanctions 
 Iranian politicians have not been easily swayed by the effects of sanctions. 
Financial sanctions hurt Iran’s poorer citizens, but have relatively little impact on the 
upper classes and ruling elite. Trade sanctions affect Iran’s population more evenly, but 
their disadvantage is that Iranian markets adjust to trade sanctions over time. When a 
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trade embargo was first implemented against Iran, the economy of the Islamic Republic 
suffered a swift downturn. Before the Islamic Revolution, Iran was dependent on the 
United States for trade. The loss of the United States as a trading partner was devastating 
to Iranian markets. Over time, Iran has adjusted and discovered alternative trading 
partners. It was easy to find new countries to buy for oil, for example, because there is 
always a need for oil, and the world market for that particular commodity is competitive. 
Unburdened by financial sanctions and able to work around trade sanctions, Iranian 
politicians have not been easily swayed by the effects of such penalties.   188
 Sanctions are effective in terms of the damage they cause, but they are not 
necessarily effective at changing policy behavior. Those who advocate against sanctions 
are concerned that “the reasons Iran craves nuclear status run too deep for it to be swayed 
by economic pressure.”  Iran wants nuclear capability so that it can gain more 189
credibility as a regional power and have a stronger chance of balancing the influence of 
Israel and the United States. Iranian rulers have expressed their belief that sanctions are 
attempts to weaken Iran militarily and challenge the Islamic regime’s legitimacy. This 
hardline view dominated Iranian politics throughout Ahmadinejad’s presidency.  190
Sanctions failed to change the behavior of his administration and only encouraged 
President Ahmadinejad to promote Iran’s nuclear program. Far from deterring the Islamic 
Republic, sanctions caused Iran’s nuclear program to evolve from strategic pursuit to 
symbolic defiance of the United States.  
!
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The Israel Lobby and Congress 
 New sanctions against Iran tend to pass with ease, supported by a majority of 
American congress members. The Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013, for example was 
drafted to broaden economic sanctions and passed in the House of Representatives by a 
400-to-20 vote in July.  Both members of the Democrat Party and the Republican Party 191
seek tough action against the Islamic Republic through legislation. The Nuclear Weapon 
Free Iran Act of 2013 is the most recent piece of legislation that shows how preventing 
Iranian nuclear capability is often framed as a bipartisan issue. Democrat Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Chairman Robert Menendez and Republican Senator Mark Kirk 
drafted the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act in response to the interim agreement between 
Iran, France, Germany, Britain, China, Russia, and the United States. Two dozen other 
senators introduced the bill with Senators Menendez and Kirk in December of 2013, 
which garnered fifty-nine co-sponsors by early January.  192
 Senators Menendez and Kirk wrote the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act with the 
goal of bolstering American diplomatic efforts to prevent Iran from achieving nuclear 
weapons capability. If passed, the bill would present Iran with various consequences, 
including sanctions, that would be implemented if talks were to fail. President Barack 
Obama requested that no additional sanctions be issued during the six-month period of 
regular talks established by the November agreement. For this reason, if the bill passes, 
new sanctions would be suspended for a year after the bill was passed. Sanctions could be 
suspended further if Iran stipulated to an agreement during talks that was deemed 
compatible with America’s security interests. There are three key points to the Nuclear 
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Weapon Free Iran Act as stated on the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s 
(AIPAC) website: (1) America must prevent Iranian nuclear weapons capability, (2) 
diplomacy must be backed by the threat of new sanctions, and (3), America must stand 
with Israel. The bill is a way to show Iran that the United States can and will take action 
if Iran does not make concessions.  193
 AIPAC lobbyists quickly started a campaign to pressure congressional members 
to support the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act, and this was not the first time AIPAC has 
expressed its support for sanctions. When President Obama first showed a willingness to 
engage Iran in 2009, six thousand members of AIPAC traveled to Capitol Hill to push for 
the passage of sanctions bills before Iran’s elections.  At the time, the House did not 194
move forward with a bill to increase sanctions, choosing instead to support President 
Obama’s efforts to directly engage Iran. In March 2010, Israel angered the United States 
by expanding illegal Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory. Vice President Joe Biden 
went to Israel to talk to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. During this visit, the 
Prime Minister announced that another 1,600 apartments would be built in a settlement in 
Arab East Jerusalem. President Obama and members of his administration were 
infuriated.  195
  Vice President Biden reportedly told Netanyahu that his decision would 
undermine the security of American troops in the Middle East and endanger regional 
peace. A week later, Netanyahu’s visit to Washington coincided with AIPAC annual 
national conference. To show support for the Israeli government, AIPAC wrote a letter to 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that was signed by 326 members of Congress in three 
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days: “it is in U.S. national security interests to assure that Israel’s security as an 
independent Jewish state is maintained.”  The controversial elections in Iran in 2009 196
combined with President Ahmadinejad’s confrontational ways changed the general 
attitude of Congress towards Iran and President Obama’s policy of engagement, which 
was now a seemingly futile strategy. Politicians needed another way to show the 
American public that they were taking proactive measures against Iran, and AIPAC 
offered a solution: show support for Israel. 
  With every new development regarding the political puzzle that is Iran’s nuclear 
program, AIPAC pressures Congress to support punitive action against Iran. AIPAC’s 
annual policy conference is a source of major Congressional lobbying about Iran. In 
2010, for example, AIPAC delegates held approximately five hundred meetings with 
Congressional members and staff. Harsh sanctions against Iran were one of the main 
issues raised by lobbyists at these meetings. AIPAC keeps a roster on the members of 
Congress, tracking their position on and support for legislation geared towards protecting 
Israel’s interests. This helps AIPAC target specific members of Congress in order pressure 
them to support legislation favored by the Israeli lobby.  197
 Maryland Democrat Senator Barbara Mikulski is a recent example of a politician 
that AIPAC lobbyists have targeted directly. As of January 2014, she had still not decided 
whether to vote for the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act. AIPAC sent an e-mail action alert 
to supporters in Maryland, urging recipients to contact the Senator’s office directly and 
ask her to show support for the pro-Israel community by co-sponsoring the bill, “a 
diplomatic insurance policy against Iran.”  At the time of the e-mail campaign, sources 198
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close to the process said that sixteen Democrats had signed on to co-sponsor the bill, and 
the threshold of sixty-seven votes necessary to make the bill veto-proof had been 
reached.   199
 Supporting sanctions has became a way for members of Congress to express their 
solidarity with Israel and their refusal to accept a nuclear Iran. American politicians favor 
Israel because of the bond between the Jewish nation and the United States. Israel has 
been an important ally of the United States since the Cold War, but the country’s 
importance to America has evolved even further in the years after 9/11. A beacon of 
democracy in the Middle East, Israel is a partner in a chaotic part of the world that is 
perceived as containing myriad threats to American values. The tension between Israel 
and Iran mirrors the tension between the United States and Iran. When an Iranian leader 
threatens Israel, he is threatening the nation in the Middle East with which the American 
public identifies most.   
 Congress members are encouraged by lobby groups to take a hardline approach. 
AIPAC encourages tough political action by publicly pressuring members of Congress 
who do not support or are hesitant about strict legislation against Iran. The Nuclear 
Weapons Free Iran Act already had enough supporters to ensure a veto-proof majority, 
yet AIPAC continued to lobby for the vote of Senator Mikulski. With regard to this 
particular act and future legislation, Senator Mikulski’s possible actions are now framed 
as a choice between Israel and Iran: either she will support an ally of the United States or 
choose to engage with a country that is a danger to American interests. 
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 In Washington, there is a sense of urgency regarding Iran’s nuclear program. 
When President Netanyahu visited the United States in 2009 amid growing tensions 
between Jerusalem and Washington, Republican Senator Lindsey Graham spoke to a 
cheering crowd at AIPAC conference, saying “‘all options must be on the table’ and ‘you 
know exactly what I’m talking about,’ indicating his support for military action against 
Iran. ‘Sometimes it is better to go to war than to allow the Holocaust to develop a second 
time.’”  As a whole, Congress has favored punitive action against Iran since the early 200
years of President Obama’s first term. If sanctions fail to motivate Iran to make 
concessions, certain Congressional members like Senator Graham support wiping out 
Iran’s nuclear program through military force.  201
 Iran’s lack of transparency has aroused suspicions, and the confrontational 
rhetoric of Iranian politicians such as those who say “Israel should be wiped off the map” 
support the notion that the Islamic Republic has sinister intentions. For certain members 
of Congress and their constituents, a grand bargain cannot be reached with a nation as 
seemingly dangerous as the Islamic Republic. Iran is viewed as a nation that functions to 
promote its own regional interests and ideology, not to respect diplomatic agreements. 
Congress as a whole, therefore, has not proposed a bill that supports increased 
engagement with Iran. From the standpoint of the Israeli lobby and its supporters in 
Congress, the safety of the United States and Israel demands that we prevent Iran from 
reaching nuclear weapons capability. Iran will either be persuaded to cease nuclear 
development by sanctions or forced to do so through swift military force.   202
!
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Conclusion: Are Sanctions the Answer? 
 In February of 2014, AIPAC surprised Republican senators by stating that the 
Nuclear Weapons Free Iran Act should be held back from an immediate vote. This 
occurred after the bill’s author, Senator Menendez, took to the Senate floor and criticized 
Republican senators for asserting that the prevention of a nuclear Iran is a partisan issue. 
In its official statement, AIPAC agreed that bipartisan support is needed.  AIPAC’s 203
motivations are unclear, however, as the group still supports the Nuclear Weapon Free 
Iran Act. Perhaps AIPACs leaders felt more time is required to target Democrats and 
create a wider pool of support for the bill. Whatever AIPAC’s logic is, the reluctance of 
Democrats to support further punitive actions against Iran is likely a small sign of their 
faith in the November 23 deal. Congressional members who support waiting to vote on 
the Act, or voting against the Act if it is put to a vote, will help give diplomacy a chance 
to work. 
  America’s special association with Israel is, in part, a result of the path-dependent 
relationship between the United States and Iran. As previously discussed, Americans, 
both politicians and their constituents, support Israel because the Jewish state is 
threatened by the same terrorist groups that pose a challenge to the United States.  204
Pierson explains that “a crucial feature of most collective action in politics is the absence 
of a linear relationship between effort and effect. Instead, collective action frequently 
involves many of the qualities conducive to positive feedback.”  Congress frequently 205
takes collective action against Iran in favor of protecting Israeli interests, and  
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congressional members are rewarded for doing so by their constituents and the Israel 
lobby. 
  One way for Congress to demonstrate a commitment to protecting the United 
States’ interests in the Middle East is to help maintain America’s relationship with Israel. 
Israel is a country that shares the democratic ideals American policymakers want to 
defend from the threats of “rogue states” like Iran.  AIPAC uses this framework to help 206
lobby support against the development of a nuclear Iran, arguing Iran would use nuclear 
weapons to “wipe Israel off the map.” Politicians can either protect Israel, a democratic 
ally, or choose to engage with Iran, a country that has threatened both the United States 
and its allies. By supporting tough action against Israel, congressional members can 
demonstrate to their constituents a commitment to protecting countries that share 
American interests and ideals.  207
 Issuing sanctions in conjunction with diplomacy is seen as a way to protect the 
interests of the United States during negotiations by placing pressure on Iranian leaders. 
This was part of the argument put forward by Condoleezza Rice when she pushed for the 
use of dual-track policy during President Bush’s administration. Sanctions are not 
intended to prevent diplomacy; rather, they are meant to motivate Iran to agree to a 
satisfactory deal regarding its nuclear program. If enacted, the Nuclear Weapons Free Iran 
Act would signal to Iran that a lack of compliance with American demands will lead to 
further economic punishment.   208
 Sanctions legislation frequently passes with bipartisan support in both Houses of 
Congress out of convenience. Through sanctions, Washington takes punitive action 
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against Iran and protects the interests of the United States and Israel without going to war. 
In other words, sanctions are an alternative choice to a grand bargain or military strike. 
The problem with sanctions is that, on their own, they are unable to effectively generate 
long-term policy change in Iran. While sanctions have provided strategic benefits in 
terms of domestic politics, the issue of Iran’s nuclear program remains unresolved. 
Sanctions have damaged Iran’s economy but have done little to change policy behavior. 
Iran continued to develop a nuclear fuel cycle during President Bush’s administration as 
well as when President Obama unsuccessfully offered to engage early in his presidency, 
all while sanctions were in place.  209
 Iran has viewed previous sanctions as a groundless attack on the country’s right to 
pursue peaceful nuclear technology under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Sanctions will do little to help the United States and the Islamic Republic repair 
diplomatic ties. New sanctions could make Iran question whether the United States truly 
wants to reach a cooperative deal with the Islamic Republic or just wants to pressure Iran 
to abandon all nuclear research. Congressmen who want to implement more sanctions 
hope to appeal to domestic constituents, but Iran is less likely to accept a deal if more 
sanctions are issued. Additional sanctions could, therefore, make it harder for foreign 
policymakers to successfully negotiate with Iran. 
 Offering to lift sanctions shows the Islamic Republic that it can benefit from 
diplomacy with the United States, but many in Congress do not unconditionally support 
sanctions relief. After the interim agreement expires, Congress may want to issue 
additional sanctions to encourage Iran to make more concessions regarding its nuclear 
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program. In this scenario, the win-sets of the United States and Iran may not overlap. The 
differences in what Iran and the United States want from a nuclear deal could make it 
difficult to negotiate a new agreement that satisfies both countries. Many domestic 
constituents in Iran do not want to sacrifice nuclear technology, while many in the United 
States want a nuclear-free Iran. If Iran refuses an agreement that requires the country to 
make more concessions to receive sanctions relief, the United States may cease 
engagement efforts. A new strategy is needed, one that encourages non-path-dependent 
behavior by rewarding both Iran and the United States for implementing policy changes. 
It will be difficult, however, for foreign policymakers to commit to such a strategy if 
Congress continues to see diplomacy with Iran as a betrayal of Israel.  210
!
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Chapter Six: The November Interim Agreement and the Fragile Promise of Diplomacy !
When Diplomacy Fails: The Case of the Tehran Declaration 
 Even if the leaders of both the United States and Iran express an interest in 
engagement, diplomacy is not easy. Just a few years before the November interim 
agreement, President Obama had a chance to reconcile with the Islamic Republic but 
rejected the opportunity for various reasons. Two countries, emboldened to prove their 
diplomatic prowess, came forward with a possible answer for the Obama administration’s 
Iran dilemma: Brazil and Turkey.  
 Brazil and Turkey were an unlikely pair to tackle the Iran issue. They are not part 
of the P5+1 permanent group within the United Nations (UN) Security Council, nor are 
they economic powers. As emerging nations, both wanted to prove they were capable of 
solving international problems.  The issue of Iran’s nuclear program presented itself as 211
the perfect opportunity for Brazil and Turkey to bolster their reputations. Each had some 
level of personal investment in resolving the growing threat of a nuclear Iran. Turkey was 
concerned that a lack of engagement with Iran would lead to war and, perceiving itself as 
a bridge between the East and West, wanted to prevent such a crisis. Both Turkey and 
Brazil traded with Iran and feared sanctions would be detrimental to business.   212
 Brazil and Turkey engaged Iran by offering a fuel-swap deal, such as the one that 
was proposed at the Geneva convention in 2009. The Brazilian-Turkish version of the 
fuel-swap deal was called the Tehran Declaration. The Declaration “stipulated that 20-
percent-enriched nuclear fuel was to be provided to Iran for its in the Tehran Research 
Reactor, which produces medical isotopes, in exchange for the removal of 1,200 
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kilograms of 3.5-percent-low-enriched uranium (LEU) to Turkey.”  The United States 213
was immediately wary of the deal. Under the Tehran Declaration, there would still be 
twenty-percent-enriched uranium inside Iranian territory. Despite doubts, America 
endorsed Brazil and Turkey’s plan to talk to Iran and offer the deal because Washington 
expected it would be unsuccessful.  214
 In May 2010, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Brazilian 
President Luiz Inácio “Lula” de Silva traveled to Tehran. After two days of negotiations, 
Iran signed the Tehran Declaration. Washington dismissed Brazil and Turkey’s success by 
criticizing their deal for “handing Iran too much and getting too little in return.”  In 215
doing so, the Obama administration showed it was still weary of making concessions to 
Iran. Sticking to the implementation of sanctions was perceived to be safer than accepting 
the Tehran Declaration.   216
 The Obama administration made immense political investments in sanctions, 
“including acts such as personal calls from Obama to other world leaders and high-level 
visits.”  Backing away from sanctions would have been detrimental to international 217
opinions of the administration. America would have faced cheers of victory from Iran and 
condemnation from allies such as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Diverging from the sanctions 
path would have threatened the various deals and concessions that had been made to 
countries such as Russia and China to secure unanimous P5+1 support. These factors, 
combined with immense pressure from Congress and AIPAC, had siphoned the Obama 
Administration’s political capitol.  In the end, the Tehran Declaration was too great of a 218
political risk for the Obama administration to accept.  
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 Following the United State’s rejection of the Tehran Declaration, new sanctions 
were passed at both the domestic and international level. Congress passed the gasoline 
sanctions on Iran with an overwhelming majority, 408-8 in the House and 99-0 in the 
Senate, and on July 1 President Obama signed the bill into law. UN sanctions had 
unanimous support and were passed. America’s rejection of the Tehran Declaration was 
seen, by some, as a diplomatic failure.  
 A former senior Obama administration official remarked, “the impression, right or 
wrong, that was created was that we could not take yes for an answer. That was not what 
I would call a triumph of diplomacy.”  Political actors are preoccupied with the short-219
term consequences of their actions because “the decisions of voters are taken in the short 
run….[Thus, political actors] will pay attention to long-term consequences only when 
these become politically salient or when they have little reason to fear short-term 
electoral retribution.”  The Obama administration’s concern over the costs of the Tehran 220
Declaration reveals how difficult it will be for Iran and the United States to change the 
nature of their relationship from antagonistic to cooperative.  
A Historic Breakthrough Agreement !
 In the early hours of the morning in Geneva on November 24, 2013, Iran reached 
an interim deal with the United States, China, Russia, France, Britain, and Germany. The 
purpose of the interim deal is to “give international negotiators time to pursue a more 
comprehensive pact that would ratchet back much of Iran’s nuclear program and ensure 
that it could only be used for peaceful purposes.”  After two more months of tedious 221
negotiations between Iran and these six world powers, the interim agreement went into 
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effect on January 20, 2014. The agreement, which is renewable, will be in place for six 
months and requires Iran to restrict nuclear activity.  
 Iran has agreed to stop building centrifuges and to stop enriching uranium beyond 
five-percent, a level that is sufficient for energy purposes but insufficient for making a 
bomb. Iran’s stockpile of twenty-percent-enriched uranium, which is close to being 
weapons-grade, is to be diluted or converted into oxide so that it cannot be used 
militarily. Additionally, Iran will demonstrate a willingness to restrict nuclear capacity by 
dismantling links between networks of centrifuges. In exchange for compliance, the 
United States has agreed to offer between six and seven billion dollars in sanctions relief. 
Roughly $4.2 billion of that relief will be in the form of oil revenues that have been 
frozen in foreign banks.  222
 The United States and Iran each exhibited cautious optimism over the agreement, 
and Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, an adamant supporter of Iran’s 
nuclear program, provided a crucial endorsement. The Ayatollah’s approval is vital 
because he has the power to override the Iranian president’s decisions. Ayatollah 
Khamenei has since tempered his support, warning he is not optimistic negotiations with 
the United States can lead to a deal that respects Iran’s right to nuclear technology.  223
Congress, the majority of which supports full Iranian nuclear dismantlement, also 
expressed concerns to President Barack Obama and his cabinet. Since President Obama 
was able to provide sanctions relief via executive order, however, the comments of 
Congress did not impede implementation of the interim agreement with Iran.   224
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  In February of 2014, a new round of negotiations began between Iran and the six 
world powers that negotiated the formulation of the interim agreement in November. The 
purpose of these talks is to create a consensus on what to do when the agreement expires 
after six months.  Resolving the nuclear standoff may prove difficult for the United 225
States and Iran. As Ayatollah Khamenei says, “I am not optimistic about the negotiations. 
It will not lead anywhere, but I am not opposed either.”  Diplomacy is  possible, as 226
exemplified by the November agreement, but vulnerable to existing antagonisms between 
the two countries.  
Who is Hassan Rouhani? The Potential for a Moderate Regime !
 Hassan Rouhani was elected president of Iran in June 2013 and helped push for 
the November agreement. Prior to winning the presidency, Rouhani was the National 
Security Advisor to the President of Iran from 1989-1997 and again from 2000-2005. He 
also served as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator from 2003-2005. Before the 1979 
Revolution, President Rouhani was a prominent Islamic activist. In his presidential 
campaign,  Rouhani promised to bring great change to Iran, save the economy, and ease 
international sanctions by negotiating an end to the nuclear stand off with the United 
States.  This, combined with his past experience, appealed to a wide range of Iranians. 227
 President Rouhani has long exhibited more moderate behavior than that of 
President Ahmadinejad. As chief nuclear negotiator, Rouhani briefly suspended uranium 
enrichment in exchange for the promise of talks about renewing trade with France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom.  Rouhani only called for uranium enrichment to 228
begin again when he was pressured to do so by the newly elected President Ahmadinejad. 
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After becoming President, Rouhani was quick to move away from the radical policies of 
his predecessor towards more moderate politics. 
 In an attempt to undo the damage caused by President Ahmadinejad, President 
Rouhani has reinstated several previously fired professionals to key managerial positions. 
In just the first one hundred days of President Rouhani’s term, “Tehran’s stock market 
shares [went] up 25%...thanks to increasing confidence in his economic policies and 
capital returning to the bourse from parallel markets like gold.”  Despite these 229
successes, Iran still has grim economic problems. Iran’s currency has lost about half its 
value since mid-2012. At least one out of four young adults is now unemployed. Inflation 
hovers somewhere between thirty-six and forty-two percent, leaving Iranian citizens 
impoverished and disgruntled. In 2012, crude oil exports dropped by forty percent to 1.5 
million barrels per day, the lowest level in over twenty-five years.  With more countries 230
agreeing to sanctions, the market for Iranian oil is shrinking rapidly. Iran’s economic 
situation has become too dire to ignore the value of diplomacy with the United States. 
President Rouhani knows that to effectively fix Iran’s economy, he will have to convince 
the United States and the international community to lift sanctions.   231
 President Rouhani has taken various steps to show that his administration is 
interested in finding a diplomatic solution with the United States to resolve the tension 
over Iran’s nuclear program. His first move was to do something that no other Iranian 
president has done since the Islamic Revolution, call an American president on the phone. 
This was the first and only direct conversation between the leaders of Iran and the United 
States in over thirty years. President Rouhani called President Obama as they were both 
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leaving the UN General Assembly in September 2013. The call was a reflection of the 
comments President Rouhani made to the Assembly, where he reached out to America 
and discussed the possibility of an opening for diplomacy between the two countries.  232
In a related gesture, President Rouhani sent Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad 
Zarif to meet his American counterpart, Secretary of State John Kerry, for the first 
time.  233
 To give credence to his efforts, President Rouhani has used social media to 
publicize feelings of good will towards America and its allies. He has two Twitter 
accounts in his name, one in Farsi and one in English, which allows him to use Twitter to 
communicate both domestically and internationally. President Rouhani has composed 
several tweets exhibiting hope that old antagonisms will not overshadow the importance 
of diplomacy. Four days after he was elected, for example, President Rouhani tweeted a 
decade-old picture of himself standing next to an American female medic at a United 
States field hospital set up after the devastating 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran. The 
picture was meant to show that President Rouhani sees the merits of American-Iranian 
cooperation. President Rouani’s twitter accounts also have tweets directed at Israel, 
including one that wished all Jewish people a happy Rosh Hashanah. Social media has 
allowed President Rouhani to spread the image of himself as a centrist leader who favors 
reconciliation over confrontation.   234
 Despite President Rouhani’s moderate messages regarding the importance of 
diplomacy and engagement with the United States, there are still doubts regarding Iran’s 
intentions. Since President Rouhani’s election, there has not been a significant effort to 
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improve Iran’s human rights record or end ties to terrorist groups. A dozen political 
prisoners were released the day before President Rouhani left for the UN General 
Assembly, but human rights groups have dismissed this as nothing more than a weak 
gesture to distract from ongoing violations. Approximately 800 political prisoners remain 
in jail, and public executions have continued. Iran still provides funding, weapons, and 
training to Hamas and Hezbollah, which are categorized as terrorist groups by the United 
States and the UN.  Failing to make an effort to change Iran’s reputation for being a 235
nation who demotes human rights and promotes terrorism could be detrimental to 
President Rouhani’s mission. 
 At his first press conference, President Rouhani said: 
 [R]elations between Iran and the United States are a complicated and difficult  
 issue. It’s nothing easy. This is a very old wound that is there, and we need to  
 think about how to heal this injury. We don’t want to see more tension. Wisdom  
 tells us both countries need to think more about the future and try to sit down and  
 find solutions to past issues and rectify things. !236!
 The solutions President Rouhani speaks of will be difficult to find. His 
enthusiasm for talks might not be enough for diplomacy to be successful if the United 
States finds reasons to doubt the sincerity of his intentions. The United States must be led 
to believe that President Rouhani’s moderate message is sincere and not just a superficial 
ploy to garner sanctions relief. President Rouhani has made efforts to show his desire to 
reconcile with America, but he also vehemently supports Iran’s nuclear program. He has 
expressed, like many Iranian leaders, that under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
Iran has a right to develop nuclear technology to bolster the economy.  For diplomacy 237
to work, President Rouhani needs to give the United States something that President 
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Ahmadinejad never did: a reason to believe Iran does not want a nuclear bomb to attack 
America and its allies.  
Reactions in Iran to President Rouhani’s Actions 
 When President Rouhani returned from the UN General Assembly on September 
28, 2013, he was met at the airport by a crowd of Iranians. Approximately 200-300 
supporters gathered to applaud his message of cooperation to the UN and his decision to 
make a phone call to President Obama. Many Iranians, suffering from economic 
hardships, want to see an end to sanctions and Iran’s international isolation. Supporters of 
President Rouhani greeted him with optimistic chants, excited to see he had made this 
first step towards negotiating an end to sanctions and bolstering Iran’s international 
position. Shouts of “Rouhani we thank you” and “Iran calls for moderation” were heard 
throughout the crowd as people held up portraits of their new leader to express their 
appreciation for his efforts.  238
 A smaller group of people at the airport had a very different message to share with 
President Rouhani. About 60-100 hardliners gathered to protest the President and throw 
eggs and stones at the new Iranian leader’s car. Some also threw shoes or banged angrily 
on the side of the car. As President Rouhani left the airport, the conservative protestors 
shouted “Death to America!”—a chant that has become standard at radical rallies in Iran 
since the Islamic Revolution. Protestors also yelled “no compromise or surrender to our 
national interests” to show they were angry that President Rouhani had reached out to the 
United States.  239
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 Based on an analysis of social media activity, most Iranians support President 
Rouhani’s outreach campaign. Iranians at home and abroad posted hundreds of messages 
on Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif’s Facebook page, expressing their satisfaction with 
President Rouhani and his administration’s conduct at the General Assembly. The 
messages were optimistic: “‘You have made the people of Iran happy, especially the 
phone call with Obama,’ read one. ‘We are proud of you’, said another. ‘Don’t be tired. We 
are hopeful that one day there will be direct flights from Tehran to Washington,’ said a 
third.”  Since the September phone call between President Rouhani and President 240
Obama, supporters of the Iranian president have had a positive reaction to negotiations 
with the United States. Nevertheless, the voices of these more moderate Iranians risk 
being drowned out by conservative disapproval. 
 On the 35th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution in February 2014, protestors 
flooded the streets of Iran. The largest rallies, traditionally organized by “hard-line 
factions that have shown strong skepticism about the negotiations,” were held in 
Tehran.  Protestors exhibited their cynicism by distributing posters and placards with 241
slogans referencing Secretary of State John Kerry’s remarks that a military strike 
remained a viable option if the talks proved unsuccessful. While marching through the 
streets, protestors shouted the traditional conservative chant “Death to America!” and 
carried posters that contained statements such as “We are ready for the great battle.” 
Others expressed anger at specific people, yelling “Death to Obama!” or “Death to 
Kerry!”   242
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 Expressions of nationalism were also rampant at the protests. Actors re-enacted 
scenes from the Iran-Iraq war. A famous Iranian children’s television puppet named 
Pangool appeared onstage to praise children for turning up to the rally, saying their 
presence was an important response to help neutralize American threats. The Islamic 
Revolutionary Guards Corps tried to increase the crowd’s energy by playing songs from 
the Islamic Revolution.   243
 The protestors who celebrated the 35th anniversary of the Revolution do not 
represent the sentiments of all Iranian citizens, but rather the opinions of the most vocal. 
Their rhetoric, however, is loud and threatening enough to have the potential to 
destabilize diplomacy. They could sway President Rouhani to take a more conservative 
approach to negotiations and reject future deals offered by the United States that entail 
further restrictions on Iran's nuclear program. 
What Does Iran Really Want? President Rouhani and The Ayatollah 
 There is concern among the United States and its allies that Iran will manipulate 
the outcome of negotiations to enhance Iranian power and regional influence. President 
Rouhani needs to demonstrate that his centrist messages are not just a ploy to obtain 
sanctions relief and that Iran is becoming a more moderate nation under his leadership. If 
the Iranian president makes too many appeasements to conservative Iranians, the United 
States, which is already feeling pressure from the Gulf and Israel, may walk away from 
the negotiating table. President Rouhani, however, has to have some elements of 
conservatism in his foreign policy or else he will lose Ayatollah Khameini’s approval. 
The Ayatollah is the ultimate executive authority in Iran. He has veto power over 
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everything from cabinet appointments to foreign policy. Alienating the supreme leader 
would be detrimental to the Iranian president’s ability to implement his international 
policy objectives.   244
 Ayatollah Khameini is the second Supreme Leader to have led Iran since the 
Islamic Revolution. He has been in power since 1989, has seen three American presidents 
come and go, and entered office when President Obama entered law school. President 
Rouhani may be able to formulate policy, but Ayatollah Khameini is the spiritual leader 
of the Iranian people with more experience than the Iranian president or President 
Obama. 
  The Ayatollah’s rhetoric does not always match his actions. In his early days in 
office, he did not want nuclear weapons, believing them to be incompatible with his 
vision of an Islamist nation. Eventually, he allowed them after being persuaded of their 
benefits.  Having the capability to build a weapon, but not actually building one, can 245
bring Iran prestige. Nuclear weapons capability would “serve as a public symbol 
solidifying the independence of Iran from Western dominance….”  Iran would emerge 246
as a leader in the Persian Gulf, something the Islamic Republic has wanted since the 
Revolution. Most importantly, perhaps, is the fact that nuclear capability gives states the 
power to “establish their identity as technologically advanced, independent powers 
deserving of special recognition.”  Iran’s acceptance of the November agreement, 247
which slows its nuclear program  prevents weaponization, may be evidence that Iran is 
not trying to build a bomb to use in offensive strikes.  
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 Perhaps what Iran wants is a tougher, more influential role in international 
politics. The Ayatollah insists that Iran's nuclear research “will not be halted at all,” yet he 
signed off on the November agreement and continues to support international talks.  248
The discrepancy between the Ayatollah’s rhetoric and his actions shows that, despite what 
he says, he is willing to slow nuclear research in exchange for concessions such as 
sanctions relief. As the country’s supreme leader, however, he has to be careful to show 
conservatives that he can stand up to the West. The international community has started 
to seriously listen to Iran. What the Ayatollah needs now is for President Rouhani to 
negotiate a deal that the supreme leader can sell to the hardliners in Iran. 
 President Rouhani is in a tough political situation. To win support for his 
initiatives, “he will have to navigate a balance between hardline principlists (so called for 
their rigid revolutionary principles) at one end of the spectrum and reform sentiments on 
the other, with many political shades between the two poles.”  More moderate than his 249
predecessor, President Rouhani understands that Iran needs sanctions relief and 
cooperative international relationships. The Iranian president must make sure agreements 
reached with the international community do not appear to sacrifice the ideals of the 
Islamic Republic. Otherwise, the Ayatollah will reject the agreement to protect his own 
image. President Rouhani’s challenge is to balance diplomacy with the ideology of the 
Islamic Republic. As he said in a debate on foreign policy during his election campaign, 
“it is very good for [nuclear] centrifuges to spin...but it’s also good for the lives of people 
to spin.”  On the anniversary of the Revolution, President Rouhani said that Tehran is 250
ready to continue negotiations and determined to engage in fair and constructive talks 
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with the United States. These statements reflected his efforts to balance reformist 
messages with conservative politics. 
Nervous Remarks from the Gulf and Israel’s Outrage 
 American allies in the Gulf had mixed reactions to the agreement. Bahrain and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE), the Gulf’s smaller states, saw the agreement as a positive 
first step towards a more secure Middle East: “We welcome this agreement if it will end 
the fear of any weapons of mass destruction in the region,” said Bahrain foreign minister 
Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa.  The UAE, despite public praise, critiqued the United 251
States for leaving the UAE and other Gulf states out of negotiations. The UAE increased 
sanctions against Iran after being pressured to do so by the United States, a move that 
was detrimental to the UAE’s economic interests. Previously, the UAE had been a hub for 
trade and commerce with Iran, but sanctions have led to economic losses.  In contrast to 252
Bahrain and the UAE, Saudi Arabia was more hesitant to express approval of the 
agreement. Saudi Arabia remains concerned that rapprochement between the United 
States and Iran will make it easier for the Shia nation to gain influence over the Middle 
East.    253
 Saudi Arabia’s concerns, while great, are not as forthright as those of Israel, which 
is actively trying to manipulate American foreign policy. Relations between the United 
States and Israel have become increasingly tense as America gets closer to rapprochement 
with Iran. In March of 2013, the United States began conducting secret, backchannel 
negotiations with Iran. Israel was not informed of these exclusive meetings until 
September of the same year. The talks were the first step towards opening up the 
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diplomatic channels that led to the agreement reached at Geneva, and Israel saw them as 
a betrayal.  Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu issued a public statement 254
condemning the November agreement with Iran the same day it was reached, saying it 
was a “historical mistake.”  255
  At the opening of his meeting with his cabinet, Prime Minister Netanyahu said: 
“Today the world has become a much more dangerous place because the most dangerous 
regime in the world has taken a significant step toward attaining the most dangerous 
weapons in the world.”  Across Israel’s political spectrum, political officials condemned 256
the agreement. Justice Minister Tzipi Livini, a moderate, said that the agreement was a 
threat to the safety of the entire world. The minister of intelligence, Naftali Bennet, 
expressed his distrust of Iranian leaders, saying that the pact is based on “Iranian 
manipulation, and on self-delusion.”  257
 Secretary of State John Kerry responded to Jerusalem’s concerns by saying the 
agreement “makes Israel safer. We believe very strongly that because the Iranian nuclear 
program is actually set backwards and is actually locked into place in critical places, that 
is better for Israel than if you were just continuing to go down the road and they rush 
towards a nuclear weapon.”  His statement did nothing to qualm Israel’s fears, and 258
Israeli politicians continued to publicly denounce the agreement. 
Hesitations in Congress 
 While both Democrats and Republicans have cautioned against sanctions relief, 
the Republican Party offered the harshest critiques against the terms of the November 
agreement. Like Israeli prime minister Netanyahu, many Republicans “are insisting on 
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zero enrichment as a condition for relaxing any sanctions against Iran. Some would even 
like to authorize the use of military force.”  They believe that a zero enrichment policy, 259
which the November agreement does not entail, is the only way to guarantee protection 
of America’s interests and Israel’s safety. Allowing Iran to possess any amount of 
enriched uranium requires America to trust that the Islamic Republic will not secretly 
continue to convert enriched uranium to build bombs.  260
  Republican politicians used Twitter to show that they believe Iran is not worthy 
of that level of trust. Several Republicans condemned the agreement as an act of 
abandonment of American allies, specifically Israel. Former White House Press Secretary 
Ari Fleischer tweeted, for example, “The Iran deal and our allies: You can’t spell 
abandonment without OBAMA.”  Others used Twitter to express their outrage that the 261
United States would cooperate with Iran, a nation whose sponsorship of terrorism 
contradicts American values. Republican Representative John Culberson from Texas 
tweeted, “Worse than Munich.” He attached two images juxtaposing Secretary of State 
John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif with Adolf Hitler and 
former British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain.  Republican Representative 262
Michele Bachmann from Minnesota also attacked President Obama and his staff, calling 
the agreement a “total surrender by [the] Obama administration.”  
 Other Congressional members demonized Iran, including Republican 
Representative Vern Buchanan from Florida who wrote, “Placing your trust in #Iran is 
like betting on a blind horse on a wet track.”  These tweets show why breaking away 263
from path dependency will be difficult for the United States and Iran. Many Congress 
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members appear to still think of Iran in the way it was portrayed by United States’ news 
outlets during the hostage crisis, as a country populated by American-hating religious 
fanatics. Any time protestors are captured on camera chanting “Death to America!” or 
politicians make a speech against Israel, this fuels the fears of Congress.  
 Critics of American-Iranian cooperation justify their unconditional opposition of 
Iran’s nuclear program by saying Iran is untrustworthy, and that engagement with Iran 
entails betraying our allies in the region. If Iran wants to cooperate, then why do Iranians 
call us the Great Satan and cheer in support of America’s demise? Iran sponsors 
terrorism, has captured American citizens in the past, and the catchphrase of radical 
Iranians is the aggressive phrase “Death to America!” At the same time, the reverse can 
also be asked: If Iran wishes for our demise, then why are President Rouhani and his 
ministers taking the time to pursue engagement? The opinions of radical Iranians, 
however frightening, are the opinions of only one group. The November agreement is 
temporary, just six months, and is a stepping stone towards more productive negotiations. 
Only time and continued diplomacy can reveal the Islamic Republic’s true intentions.  
 If Iran fails to follow through on its promises and aggressively ratchets up nuclear 
development, sanctions can be reimplemented to slow technological advancement while 
other options are pursued. But if the Obama administration succumbs to Israeli and 
Congressional distrust and demands the complete dismantlement of Iranian nuclear 
facilities, Iran will likely cease to engage in diplomacy with the United States. President 
Rouhani cannot afford full dismantlement of Iran’s nuclear facilities, for this would pit 
him against his more conservative constituents. Negotiations would therefore fall apart, 
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and Iran would pursue nuclear development without giving the United States any 
opportunity to impact how Iran’s nuclear program is conducted. If Iran reveals violent 
motives, it would be easier to revert to punitive actions than try to restart negotiations 
with a peacefully intentioned Islamic Republic spurned by distrust.  
Conclusion: The Fragility of the November Agreement 
 The November agreement opened a window of opportunity for the United States 
and Iran to change their path-dependent relationship. Decades ago, before the Islamic 
Revolution, American-Iranian relations consisted of trust. The November deal offers a 
glimmer of hope that such mutually beneficial cooperation can be restored. The historic 
nature of the agreement, the first diplomatic accord between the two nations since the 
hostage crisis, raises the question: Why now?  
 For more than thirty years, the United States and Iran have been hostile towards 
one another. When Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was overthrown by the Islamic 
Revolution, American-Iranian relations started to crumble. The subsequent 444-day 
capture of American citizens by Iranian students changed the relationship between the 
Islamic Republic and the United States. The consequences of the hostage crisis were 
severe enough to continue to impact American and Iranian views of one another, decades 
after the hostages were freed. 
 In the case of the United States and Iran, renewed relations could be beneficial for 
each country. The agreement was a way for the newly elected, more moderate President 
Rouhani to gain credibility for the promises he made to his constituents to restore trust 
between Iran and the United States.  The sanctions relief that the November agreement 264
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provided will help ease some of the pressures currently placed on the Iranian economy, 
for which many citizens are grateful. With respect to the United States, the November 
deal “opened up a new path toward a world that is more secure, a future in which 
[America] can verify that Iran’s nuclear program is peaceful and that it cannot build a 
nuclear weapon.”  The United States saw the election of President Rouhani as an 265
opportune moment to solve the issue of Iran’s nuclear program through diplomacy. Doing 
so could prevent the necessity for a military strike and allow the United States to have a 
stronger guarantee that Iran will not attack America or American allies with a nuclear 
weapon.   266
  Despite the benefits for each country, the negotiations that have taken place since 
the November agreement was implemented in January could fail to lead to a replacement 
deal. As discussed by Putnam, domestic politics have a huge influence on encouraging 
political actors to push for change. Diplomacy is not easy for leaders whose efforts are 
perceived by some as concessions to the enemy. After the 9/11 attacks, there was a small 
window of opportunity for rapprochement. The Islamic Republic saw an opportunity to 
increase Iranian influence in the Middle East and was willing to cooperate with the 
United States to achieve that goal. But America felt more vulnerable than ever before, 
and President Bush spurned the Iranians in his Axis of Evil speech. The political cost of 
cooperating with a country that had previously threatened American citizens, and that still 
sponsors terrorist groups, was too high.  
 American-Iranian relations after 9/11 demonstrated there has to be a belief among 
domestic agencies and their constituents that an international agreement will be 
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beneficial. In his conclusion, Pierson summarizes why path dependency occurs, 
explaining: 
 [T]he claims in path dependent arguments are that previously viable options may  
 be foreclosed in the aftermath of a sustained period of positive feedback, and  
 cumulative commitments on the existing path will often make change difficult  
 and will condition the form in which new branchings will occur.  267!
A country’s leaders and foreign policymakers are not easily motivated to act against path 
dependency because various entities put pressure on them to maintain the international 
status quo. In Iran, the Ayatollah will only endorse an agreement if he believes he can 
ultimately convince the majority of the Iranian people to support it. As it stands in the 
United States, most American congresspersons will only support an agreement that is not 
perceived as a threat to Israel’s interests. 
 American and Iranian leaders are often rewarded by various agents that have 
“commitments" for not enacting change. President George Bush, for example, garnered 
support for the War on Terror, in part, through the demonization of Iran and other 
countries. In Iran, President Mohammed Ahmadinejad attacked the United States during 
his election, gaining the votes of the country’s conservatives and winning the presidency. 
President Obama and President Rouhani now face the challenge of engaging in 
diplomacy while facing opposition from those who supported their predecessor’s 
policies.  
 Since he was sworn into office, President Obama has struggled to pick up the 
pieces of President Bush’s policy of non-engagement and formulate a new strategy to 
approach Iran. Leaders often make choices that support path dependence because they are 
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fearful of the consequences of change. President Obama’s plan to engage Iran was 
impeded by the reality of the complicated nature of the Iranian nuclear program. 
Congress has encouraged him to take punitive action, and regional allies such as Saudi 
Arabia threaten President Obama’s ability to negotiate with Iran. Allies in the Gulf, most 
notably Saudi Arabia, want to prevent Iran from encroaching on their influence, and 
Jerusalem claims that the Islamic Republic is a direct threat to Israel’s safety.  
 When the Obama administration realized it would be difficult to engage Iran, two 
choices emerged: a grand bargain or a military strike. Bargaining with Iran could be 
detrimental to trade relations with the Gulf, but a military strike to eliminate Iran’s 
nuclear facilities, as Israel wants, would have disastrous consequences. The Obama 
administration has pursued sanctions to avoid the choice between a bargain or offensive 
strike. Sanctions are a safe and appealing form of punitive action. They are not as risky as 
military intervention, and they appease American allies as well as the Israel lobby and 
Congress.   268
 The Obama administration has relied on sanctions to avoid making a choice 
between engagement or war, but the effectiveness of sanctions has proven limited. 
Sanctions support path dependency by failing to generate long-term political behavioral 
change. On their own, sanctions are insufficient to convince Iran to slow uranium 
enrichment for various reasons, including that Iran can partially adjust to the economic 
impact of sanctions by doing business with other nations. Punitive action against Iran’s 
economy gives vocal Iranian hardliners evidence to support their claim that the United 
States is wrongfully punishing Iran and disregarding its right to peaceful nuclear 
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technology. This sentiment can be detrimental to negotiations between the United States 
and Iran by making the Islamic Republic less receptive to diplomacy.   
 Various influences in the past have encouraged President Obama to support 
sanctions, even though their effectiveness is limited. When Brazil and Turkey presented 
an alternative fuel-swap deal, for example, President Obama rejected the new option 
because the political costs of backing away from sanctions were too high. Congress, 
influenced by the Israel lobby, views punitive legislation against Iran favorably and was 
with the November agreement because “there is strong criticism of any agreement that 
does not fully dismantle Iran’s nuclear program.”  The Obama administration has been 269
rewarded with positive feedback from Congress and constituents for additional 
implementation of sanctions. President Obama can cease enforcing sanctions, but the cost 
would be accusations from Congress that he was disrespecting legislative authority and 
failing to enforce the law.  270
 President Rouhani could also refrain from agreeing to a deal with the United 
States if Iranian domestic agencies attack him for offering too many concessions to 
America. Putnam explains that foreign policymakers account for domestic constituents, 
in part, to protect their chances in the next election. President Rouhani can run for 
reelection, but he has to be careful not to anger hardliners in his country or risk losing too 
many of their votes. Conservative Iranians are skeptical about the United States’ 
intentions and do not want the Islamic Republic to succumb to the influence of America, 
the Great Satan.  President Rouhani also has to make sure that Ayatollah Khameini, 271
who has extensive veto power, approves any new agreement. The Ayatollah wants to 
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appeal to the country’s conservatives and will support an agreement if he can convince 
hardliners that Iranian interests are not being sacrificed in favor of cooperation with the 
Great Satan.  President Rouhani’s willingness to offer further restrictions on Iran's 272
nuclear program is finite because of the limitations placed on his power as president and 
the need to appease constituents to protect his position.   273
 The fact that the history of American-Iranian relations is so tumultuous means that 
one misstep from either side could negate the significant progress of the November deal. 
If the voices of radical Iranians chanting “Death to America!” grow too loud, the United 
States will lose the motivation to trust Iran. The United States needs to be convinced that 
Iran is not the nation it appeared to be in 1979, a nation full of hatred towards America. 
Iran, in turn, needs to believe that the United States is not the meddlesome Great Satan, 
intent on manipulating Iranian affairs to serve American and Israeli interests. 
 The current negotiations with Iran are full of fragile promise. Engaging Iran will 
make it easier for the United States to influence how Iran conducts its nuclear program. 
In exchange for continued and increased Iranian transparency, the United States can offer 
sanctions relief. If negotiations fall apart, these options will be unavailable to the United 
States, and Iran will continue enriching uranium unmonitored. Only through continued 
diplomacy can the United States and Iran come to an agreement that is beneficial to the 
interests of both countries. By maintaining a dialogue, the two countries reach an 
agreement that allows their respective leaders to be rewarded domestically for non-path-
dependent behavior. If President Obama can formulate an improved Iran policy, his time 
!104
in office could mark the beginning of a new era of understanding between the United 
States and the Islamic Republic. 
!
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Afterword 
 On April 11, 2014, the Obama administration said it would block Iran’s nominee 
for ambassador to the United Nations, Hamid Aboutalebi, from entering the United 
States. The decision to deny a visa to the diplomat, “who was allegedly involved in the 
1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, followed intense political pressure on the 
administration from Republicans and Democrats on Capitol Hill.”  Despite the tensions 274
between the United States and Iran, Iran has a notable presence at the United Nations, 
and Iranian representatives have never been prohibited from entering the UN’s host 
country. Aboutalebi denies the accusations against him and says he was not involved in 
the capture of the embassy. President Rouhani’s government says it will continue to stand 
by its nominee, and Tehran plans to use official UN channels to challenge Washington’s 
decision.   275
 Regardless of whether Aboutaleibi was actually involved in the hostage crisis, the 
decision to deny him entry, which potentially violates the duties of the United States as 
the host country for the UN, is representative of the tensions that still plague American-
Iranian relations. Iran has underestimated how much the hostage crisis continues to affect 
American perceptions of the Islamic Republic. Unless Iran issues a formal apology for 
the hostage crisis, something it has never done, the United States likely will continue to 
exhibit distrust.  
 The Obama administration, however, should be careful. Iran has held up its end of 
the bargain by stalling nuclear enrichment, providing information about facilities and 
allowing IAEA inspectors to enter the country.  The United States has been slower to 276
!106
deliver promised sanctions relief. Iranians say they have experienced little economic aid, 
and many doubt that the November agreement has been beneficial for their country.  In 277
order to reach a replacement deal after the November agreement expires, the Obama 
administration should give more concessions. Sanctions relief could also be a way for 
Washington to show a continued willingness to engage Tehran. If the Obama 
administration sweetens the pot, Iranians could see that diplomacy with the United States 
is beneficial. Perhaps, then, Iran would also be willing to unclench its fist and apologize 
for past grievances, thereby demonstrating the Islamic Republic is neither inherently nor 
perpetually an enemy of the United States.  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